 @@ -1,14 +1,14 @@
-/*	$NetBSD: ntp_crypto.c,v 1.10.4.1 2007/08/21 08:40:01 ghen Exp $	*/
+/*	$NetBSD: ntp_crypto.c,v 1.10.4.2 2009/05/26 05:17:29 snj Exp $	*/
 /*
  * ntp_crypto.c - NTP version 4 public key routines
  */
 #ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
 #include <config.h>
 #endif
 #ifdef OPENSSL
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <sys/param.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 @@ -562,27 +562,27 @@ crypto_recv(
 			/*
 			 * Save status word, host name and message
 			 * digest/signature type.
 			 */
 			peer->crypto = fstamp;
 			peer->digest = dp;
 			peer->subject = emalloc(vallen + 1);
 			memcpy(peer->subject, ep->pkt, vallen);
 			peer->subject[vallen] = '\0';
 			peer->issuer = emalloc(vallen + 1);
 			strcpy(peer->issuer, peer->subject);
 			temp32 = (fstamp >> 16) & 0xffff;
-			sprintf(statstr,
+			snprintf(statstr, NTP_MAXSTRLEN,
 			    "flags 0x%x host %s signature %s", fstamp,
 			    peer->subject, OBJ_nid2ln(temp32));
 			record_crypto_stats(&peer->srcadr, statstr);
 #ifdef DEBUG
 			if (debug)
 				printf("crypto_recv: %s\n", statstr);
 #endif
 			break;
 		/*
 		 * Decode X509 certificate in ASN.1 format and extract
 		 * the data containing, among other things, subject
 		 * name and public key. In the default identification
 @@ -628,27 +628,28 @@ crypto_recv(
 			 * that this certificate might not be signed by
 			 * the server, so we can't check the
 			 * signature/digest NID.
 			 */
 			if (peer->pkey == NULL) {
 				ptr = (u_char *)cinfo->cert.ptr;
 				cert = d2i_X509(NULL, &ptr,
 				    ntohl(cinfo->cert.vallen));
 				peer->pkey = X509_get_pubkey(cert);
 				X509_free(cert);
+			}
 			peer->flash &= ~TEST8;
 			temp32 = cinfo->nid;
-			sprintf(statstr, "cert %s 0x%x %s (%u) fs %u",
+			snprintf(statstr, NTP_MAXSTRLEN,
 			    "cert %s 0x%x %s (%u) fs %u",
 			    cinfo->subject, cinfo->flags,
 			    OBJ_nid2ln(temp32), temp32,
 			    ntohl(ep->fstamp));
 			record_crypto_stats(&peer->srcadr, statstr);
 #ifdef DEBUG
 			if (debug)
 				printf("crypto_recv: %s\n", statstr);
 #endif
 			break;
 		/*
 		 * Schnorr (IFF)identity scheme. This scheme is designed
 		 * for use with shared secret group keys and where the
 @@ -677,27 +678,27 @@ crypto_recv(
 			 * the certificate public key, as well as the
 			 * server public key, signatyre and identity are
 			 * all verified at the same time. The server is
 			 * declared trusted, so we skip further
 			 * certificate stages and move immediately to
 			 * the cookie stage.
 			 */
 			if ((rval = crypto_iff(ep, peer)) != XEVNT_OK)
 				break;
 			peer->crypto |= CRYPTO_FLAG_VRFY |
 			    CRYPTO_FLAG_PROV;
 			peer->flash &= ~TEST8;
-			sprintf(statstr, "iff fs %u",
+			snprintf(statstr, NTP_MAXSTRLEN, "iff fs %u",
 			    ntohl(ep->fstamp));
 			record_crypto_stats(&peer->srcadr, statstr);
 #ifdef DEBUG
 			if (debug)
 				printf("crypto_recv: %s\n", statstr);
 #endif
 			break;
 		/*
 		 * Guillou-Quisquater (GQ) identity scheme. This scheme
 		 * is designed for use with public certificates carrying
 		 * the GQ public key in an extension field. The client
 		 * sends a challenge to the server, which performs a
 @@ -725,27 +726,27 @@ crypto_recv(
 			 * the certificate public key, as well as the
 			 * server public key, signatyre and identity are
 			 * all verified at the same time. The server is
 			 * declared trusted, so we skip further
 			 * certificate stages and move immediately to
 			 * the cookie stage.
 			 */
 			if ((rval = crypto_gq(ep, peer)) != XEVNT_OK)
 				break;
 			peer->crypto |= CRYPTO_FLAG_VRFY |
 			    CRYPTO_FLAG_PROV;
 			peer->flash &= ~TEST8;
-			sprintf(statstr, "gq fs %u",
+			snprintf(statstr, NTP_MAXSTRLEN, "gq fs %u",
 			    ntohl(ep->fstamp));
 			record_crypto_stats(&peer->srcadr, statstr);
 #ifdef DEBUG
 			if (debug)
 				printf("crypto_recv: %s\n", statstr);
 #endif
 			break;
 		/*
 		 * MV
 		 */
 		case CRYPTO_MV | CRYPTO_RESP:
 @@ -766,27 +767,27 @@ crypto_recv(
 			 * the certificate public key, as well as the
 			 * server public key, signatyre and identity are
 			 * all verified at the same time. The server is
 			 * declared trusted, so we skip further
 			 * certificate stages and move immediately to
 			 * the cookie stage.
 			 */
 			if ((rval = crypto_mv(ep, peer)) != XEVNT_OK)
 				break;
 			peer->crypto |= CRYPTO_FLAG_VRFY |
 			    CRYPTO_FLAG_PROV;
 			peer->flash &= ~TEST8;
-			sprintf(statstr, "mv fs %u",
+			snprintf(statstr, NTP_MAXSTRLEN, "mv fs %u",
 			    ntohl(ep->fstamp));
 			record_crypto_stats(&peer->srcadr, statstr);
 #ifdef DEBUG
 			if (debug)
 				printf("crypto_recv: %s\n", statstr);
 #endif
 			break;
 		/*
 		 * Cookie request in symmetric modes. Roll a random
 		 * cookie and install in symmetric mode. Encrypt for the
 		 * response, which is transmitted later.
 		 */
 @@ -820,27 +821,27 @@ crypto_recv(
 			/*
 			 * Install cookie values and light the cookie
 			 * bit. The transmit side will pick up and
 			 * encrypt it for the response.
 			 */
 			key_expire(peer);
 			peer->cookval.tstamp = ep->tstamp;
 			peer->cookval.fstamp = ep->fstamp;
 			RAND_bytes((u_char *)&peer->pcookie, 4);
 			peer->crypto &= ~CRYPTO_FLAG_AUTO;
 			peer->crypto |= CRYPTO_FLAG_AGREE;
 			peer->flash &= ~TEST8;
-			sprintf(statstr, "cook %x ts %u fs %u",
+			snprintf(statstr, NTP_MAXSTRLEN, "cook %x ts %u fs %u",
 			    peer->pcookie, ntohl(ep->tstamp),
 			    ntohl(ep->fstamp));
 			record_crypto_stats(&peer->srcadr, statstr);
 #ifdef DEBUG
 			if (debug)
 				printf("crypto_recv: %s\n", statstr);
 #endif
 			break;
 		/*
 		 * Cookie response in client and symmetric modes. If the
 		 * cookie bit is set, the working cookie is the EXOR of
 		 * the current and new values.
 @@ -885,27 +886,27 @@ crypto_recv(
 			peer->cookval.tstamp = ep->tstamp;
 			peer->cookval.fstamp = ep->fstamp;
 			if (peer->crypto & CRYPTO_FLAG_AGREE)
 				peer->pcookie ^= cookie;
 			else
 				peer->pcookie = cookie;
 			if (peer->hmode == MODE_CLIENT &&
 			    !(peer->cast_flags & MDF_BCLNT))
 				peer->crypto |= CRYPTO_FLAG_AUTO;
 			else
 				peer->crypto &= ~CRYPTO_FLAG_AUTO;
 			peer->crypto |= CRYPTO_FLAG_AGREE;
 			peer->flash &= ~TEST8;
-			sprintf(statstr, "cook %x ts %u fs %u",
+			snprintf(statstr, NTP_MAXSTRLEN, "cook %x ts %u fs %u",
 			    peer->pcookie, ntohl(ep->tstamp),
 			    ntohl(ep->fstamp));
 			record_crypto_stats(&peer->srcadr, statstr);
 #ifdef DEBUG
 			if (debug)
 				printf("crypto_recv: %s\n", statstr);
 #endif
 			break;
 		/*
 		 * Install autokey values in broadcast client and
 		 * symmetric modes. We have to do this every time the
 		 * sever/peer cookie changes or a new keylist is
 @@ -936,27 +937,27 @@ crypto_recv(
 			 */
 			if (peer->recval.ptr == NULL)
 				peer->recval.ptr =
 				    emalloc(sizeof(struct autokey));
 			bp = (struct autokey *)peer->recval.ptr;
 			peer->recval.tstamp = ep->tstamp;
 			peer->recval.fstamp = ep->fstamp;
 			ap = (struct autokey *)ep->pkt;
 			bp->seq = ntohl(ap->seq);
 			bp->key = ntohl(ap->key);
 			peer->pkeyid = bp->key;
 			peer->crypto |= CRYPTO_FLAG_AUTO;
 			peer->flash &= ~TEST8;
-			sprintf(statstr,
+			snprintf(statstr, NTP_MAXSTRLEN,
 			    "auto seq %d key %x ts %u fs %u", bp->seq,
 			    bp->key, ntohl(ep->tstamp),
 			    ntohl(ep->fstamp));
 			record_crypto_stats(&peer->srcadr, statstr);
 #ifdef DEBUG
 			if (debug)
 				printf("crypto_recv: %s\n", statstr);
 #endif
 			break;
 		/*
 		 * X509 certificate sign response. Validate the
 		 * certificate signed by the server and install. Later
 @@ -979,27 +980,28 @@ crypto_recv(
 				break;
 			/*
 			 * Scan the certificate list to delete old
 			 * versions and link the newest version first on
 			 * the list.
 			 */
 			if ((rval = cert_install(ep, peer)) != XEVNT_OK)
 				break;
 			peer->crypto |= CRYPTO_FLAG_SIGN;
 			peer->flash &= ~TEST8;
 			temp32 = cinfo->nid;
-			sprintf(statstr, "sign %s 0x%x %s (%u) fs %u",
+			snprintf(statstr, NTP_MAXSTRLEN,
 			    "sign %s 0x%x %s (%u) fs %u",
 			    cinfo->issuer, cinfo->flags,
 			    OBJ_nid2ln(temp32), temp32,
 			    ntohl(ep->fstamp));
 			record_crypto_stats(&peer->srcadr, statstr);
 #ifdef DEBUG
 			if (debug)
 				printf("crypto_recv: %s\n", statstr);
 #endif
 			break;
 		/*
 		 * Install leapseconds table in symmetric modes. This
 		 * table is proventicated to the NIST primary servers,
 @@ -1063,27 +1065,28 @@ crypto_recv(
 			if (ntohl(peer->tai_leap.fstamp) >
 			    ntohl(tai_leap.fstamp)) {
 				tai_leap.fstamp = ep->fstamp;
 				tai_leap.vallen = ep->vallen;
 				if (tai_leap.ptr != NULL)
 					free(tai_leap.ptr);
 				tai_leap.ptr = emalloc(vallen);
 				memcpy(tai_leap.ptr, ep->pkt, vallen);
 				crypto_update();
+			}
 			crypto_flags |= CRYPTO_FLAG_TAI;
 			peer->crypto |= CRYPTO_FLAG_LEAP;
 			peer->flash &= ~TEST8;
-			sprintf(statstr, "leap %u ts %u fs %u", vallen,
+			snprintf(statstr, NTP_MAXSTRLEN,
 			    "leap %u ts %u fs %u", vallen,
 			    ntohl(ep->tstamp), ntohl(ep->fstamp));
 			record_crypto_stats(&peer->srcadr, statstr);
 #ifdef DEBUG
 			if (debug)
 				printf("crypto_recv: %s\n", statstr);
 #endif
 			break;
 		/*
 		 * We come here in symmetric modes for miscellaneous
 		 * commands that have value fields but are processed on
 		 * the transmit side. All we need do here is check for
 		 * valid field length. Remaining checks are below and on
 @@ -1119,27 +1122,27 @@ crypto_recv(
 				peer->cmmd = fp;
+			}
+		}
 		/*
 		 * We don't log length/format/timestamp errors and
 		 * duplicates, which are log clogging vulnerabilities.
 		 * The first error found terminates the extension field
 		 * scan and we return the laundry to the caller. A
 		 * length/format/timestamp error on transmit is
 		 * cheerfully ignored, as the message is not sent.
 		 */
 		if (rval > XEVNT_TSP) {
-			sprintf(statstr,
+			snprintf(statstr, NTP_MAXSTRLEN,
 			    "error %x opcode %x ts %u fs %u", rval,
 			    code, tstamp, fstamp);
 			record_crypto_stats(&peer->srcadr, statstr);
 			report_event(rval, peer);
 #ifdef DEBUG
 			if (debug)
 				printf("crypto_recv: %s\n", statstr);
 #endif
 			break;
 		} else if (rval > XEVNT_OK && (code & CRYPTO_RESP)) {
 			rval = XEVNT_OK;
+		}
 @@ -1445,27 +1448,28 @@ crypto_xmit(
 	 * flag as error.
 	 */
 	default:
 		if (opcode & CRYPTO_RESP)
 			rval = XEVNT_ERR;
+	}
 	/*
 	 * In case of error, flame the log. If a request, toss the
 	 * puppy; if a response, return so the sender can flame, too.
 	 */
 	if (rval != XEVNT_OK) {
 		opcode |= CRYPTO_ERROR;
-		sprintf(statstr, "error %x opcode %x", rval, opcode);
+		snprintf(statstr, NTP_MAXSTRLEN,
 		    "error %x opcode %x", rval, opcode);
 		record_crypto_stats(srcadr_sin, statstr);
 		report_event(rval, NULL);
 #ifdef DEBUG
 		if (debug)
 			printf("crypto_xmit: %s\n", statstr);
 #endif
 		if (!(opcode & CRYPTO_RESP))
 			return (0);
+	}
 	/*
 	 * Round up the field length to a multiple of 8 bytes and save
 	 * the request code and length.
 @@ -1944,27 +1948,28 @@ crypto_update(void)
 	 */
 	if (tai_leap.vallen != 0) {
 		tai_leap.tstamp = hostval.tstamp;
 		tai_leap.siglen = 0;
 		if (tai_leap.sig == NULL)
 			tai_leap.sig = emalloc(sign_siglen);
 		EVP_SignInit(&ctx, sign_digest);
 		EVP_SignUpdate(&ctx, (u_char *)&tai_leap, 12);
 		EVP_SignUpdate(&ctx, tai_leap.ptr,
 		    ntohl(tai_leap.vallen));
 		if (EVP_SignFinal(&ctx, tai_leap.sig, &len, sign_pkey))
 			tai_leap.siglen = htonl(len);
+	}
-	sprintf(statstr, "update ts %u", ntohl(hostval.tstamp));
+	snprintf(statstr, NTP_MAXSTRLEN,
 	    "update ts %u", ntohl(hostval.tstamp));
 	record_crypto_stats(NULL, statstr);
 #ifdef DEBUG
 	if (debug)
 		printf("crypto_update: %s\n", statstr);
 #endif
+}
 /*
  * value_free - free value structure components.
+ *
  * Returns void (no errors)
  */
 @@ -3598,27 +3603,27 @@ crypto_key(
 	pkey = PEM_read_PrivateKey(str, NULL, NULL, passwd);
 	fclose(str);
 	if (pkey == NULL) {
 		msyslog(LOG_ERR, "crypto_key %s\n",
 		    ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
 		return (NULL);
+	}
 	/*
 	 * Leave tracks in the cryptostats.
 	 */
 	if ((ptr = strrchr(linkname, '\n')) != NULL)
 		*ptr = '\0';
-	sprintf(statstr, "%s mod %d", &linkname[2],
+	snprintf(statstr, NTP_MAXSTRLEN, "%s mod %d", &linkname[2],
 	    EVP_PKEY_size(pkey) * 8);
 	record_crypto_stats(NULL, statstr);
 #ifdef DEBUG
 	if (debug)
 		printf("crypto_key: %s\n", statstr);
 	if (debug > 1) {
 		if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
 			DSA_print_fp(stdout, pkey->pkey.dsa, 0);
 		else
 			RSA_print_fp(stdout, pkey->pkey.rsa, 0);
+	}
 #endif
 	return (pkey);
 @@ -3707,28 +3712,28 @@ crypto_cert(
 	free(name);
 	/*
 	 * Parse certificate and generate info/value structure.
 	 */
 	ret = cert_parse(data, len, fstamp);
 	free(data);
 	(void)fclose(str);
 	if (ret == NULL)
 		return (NULL);
 	if ((ptr = strrchr(linkname, '\n')) != NULL)
 		*ptr = '\0';
-	sprintf(statstr, "%s 0x%x len %lu", &linkname[2], ret->flags,
+	snprintf(statstr, NTP_MAXSTRLEN,
-	    len);
+	    "%s 0x%x len %lu", &linkname[2], ret->flags, len);
 	record_crypto_stats(NULL, statstr);
 #ifdef DEBUG
 	if (debug)
 		printf("crypto_cert: %s\n", statstr);
 #endif
 	return (ret);
+}
 /*
  * crypto_tai - load leapseconds table from file
+ *
  * This routine loads the ERTS leapsecond file in NIST text format,
 @@ -3824,27 +3829,27 @@ crypto_tai(
+	}
 	/*
 	 * The extension field table entries consists of the NTP seconds
 	 * of leap insertion in network byte order.
 	 */
 	len = i * sizeof(u_int32);
 	tai_leap.vallen = htonl(len);
 	ptr = emalloc(len);
 	tai_leap.ptr = (u_char *)ptr;
 	for (j = 0; j < i; j++)
 		*ptr++ = htonl(leapsec[j]);
 	crypto_flags |= CRYPTO_FLAG_TAI;
-	sprintf(statstr, "%s fs %u leap %u len %u", cp, fstamp,
+	snprintf(statstr, NTP_MAXSTRLEN, "%s fs %u leap %u len %u", cp, fstamp,
 	   leapsec[--j], len);
 	record_crypto_stats(NULL, statstr);
 #ifdef DEBUG
 	if (debug)
 		printf("crypto_tai: %s\n", statstr);
 #endif
+}
 /*
  * crypto_setup - load keys, certificate and leapseconds table
+ *
  * This routine loads the public/private host key and certificate. If