 @@ -1,629 +1,627 @@
-/*	$NetBSD: kern_prot.c,v 1.112 2011/04/26 19:58:12 martin Exp $	*/
+/*	$NetBSD: kern_prot.c,v 1.113 2011/04/27 06:22:11 martin Exp $	*/
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 1982, 1986, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993
  *	The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
  * (c) UNIX System Laboratories, Inc.
  * All or some portions of this file are derived from material licensed
  * to the University of California by American Telephone and Telegraph
  * Co. or Unix System Laboratories, Inc. and are reproduced herein with
  * the permission of UNIX System Laboratories, Inc.
+ *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
  * are met:
  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
  * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
  *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
  *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
  * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
  * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
  * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
  * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
  * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
  * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
  *	@(#)kern_prot.c	8.9 (Berkeley) 2/14/95
  */
 /*
  * System calls related to processes and protection
  */
 #include <sys/cdefs.h>
-__KERNEL_RCSID(0, "$NetBSD: kern_prot.c,v 1.112 2011/04/26 19:58:12 martin Exp $");
+__KERNEL_RCSID(0, "$NetBSD: kern_prot.c,v 1.113 2011/04/27 06:22:11 martin Exp $");
 #include "opt_compat_43.h"
 #include <sys/param.h>
 #include <sys/acct.h>
 #include <sys/systm.h>
 #include <sys/ucred.h>
 #include <sys/proc.h>
 #include <sys/timeb.h>
 #include <sys/times.h>
 #include <sys/pool.h>
 #include <sys/prot.h>
 #include <sys/syslog.h>
 #include <sys/uidinfo.h>
 #include <sys/kauth.h>
 #include <sys/mount.h>
 #include <sys/syscallargs.h>
 int	sys_getpid(struct lwp *, const void *, register_t *);
 int	sys_getpid_with_ppid(struct lwp *, const void *, register_t *);
 int	sys_getuid(struct lwp *, const void *, register_t *);
 int	sys_getuid_with_euid(struct lwp *, const void *, register_t *);
 int	sys_getgid(struct lwp *, const void *, register_t *);
 int	sys_getgid_with_egid(struct lwp *, const void *, register_t *);
 /* ARGSUSED */
 int
 sys_getpid(struct lwp *l, const void *v, register_t *retval)
+{
 	struct proc *p = l->l_proc;
 	*retval = p->p_pid;
 	return (0);
+}
 /* ARGSUSED */
 int
 sys_getpid_with_ppid(struct lwp *l, const void *v, register_t *retval)
+{
 	struct proc *p = l->l_proc;
 	retval[0] = p->p_pid;
 	retval[1] = p->p_ppid;
 	return (0);
+}
 /* ARGSUSED */
 int
 sys_getppid(struct lwp *l, const void *v, register_t *retval)
+{
 	struct proc *p = l->l_proc;
 	*retval = p->p_ppid;
 	return (0);
+}
 /* Get process group ID; note that POSIX getpgrp takes no parameter */
 int
 sys_getpgrp(struct lwp *l, const void *v, register_t *retval)
+{
 	struct proc *p = l->l_proc;
 	mutex_enter(proc_lock);
 	*retval = p->p_pgrp->pg_id;
 	mutex_exit(proc_lock);
 	return (0);
+}
 /*
  * Return the process group ID of the session leader (session ID)
  * for the specified process.
  */
 int
 sys_getsid(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_getsid_args *uap, register_t *retval)
+{
 	/* {
 		syscalldarg(pid_t) pid;
 	} */
 	pid_t pid = SCARG(uap, pid);
 	struct proc *p;
 	int error = 0;
 	mutex_enter(proc_lock);
 	if (pid == 0)
 		*retval = l->l_proc->p_session->s_sid;
 	else if ((p = proc_find(pid)) != NULL)
 		*retval = p->p_session->s_sid;
 	else
 		error = ESRCH;
 	mutex_exit(proc_lock);
 	return error;
+}
 int
 sys_getpgid(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_getpgid_args *uap, register_t *retval)
+{
 	/* {
 		syscallarg(pid_t) pid;
 	} */
 	pid_t pid = SCARG(uap, pid);
 	struct proc *p;
 	int error = 0;
 	mutex_enter(proc_lock);
 	if (pid == 0)
 		*retval = l->l_proc->p_pgid;
 	else if ((p = proc_find(pid)) != NULL)
 		*retval = p->p_pgid;
 	else
 		error = ESRCH;
 	mutex_exit(proc_lock);
 	return error;
+}
 /* ARGSUSED */
 int
 sys_getuid(struct lwp *l, const void *v, register_t *retval)
+{
 	*retval = kauth_cred_getuid(l->l_cred);
 	return (0);
+}
 /* ARGSUSED */
 int
 sys_getuid_with_euid(struct lwp *l, const void *v, register_t *retval)
+{
 	retval[0] = kauth_cred_getuid(l->l_cred);
 	retval[1] = kauth_cred_geteuid(l->l_cred);
 	return (0);
+}
 /* ARGSUSED */
 int
 sys_geteuid(struct lwp *l, const void *v, register_t *retval)
+{
 	*retval = kauth_cred_geteuid(l->l_cred);
 	return (0);
+}
 /* ARGSUSED */
 int
 sys_getgid(struct lwp *l, const void *v, register_t *retval)
+{
 	*retval = kauth_cred_getgid(l->l_cred);
 	return (0);
+}
 /* ARGSUSED */
 int
 sys_getgid_with_egid(struct lwp *l, const void *v, register_t *retval)
+{
 	retval[0] = kauth_cred_getgid(l->l_cred);
 	retval[1] = kauth_cred_getegid(l->l_cred);
 	return (0);
+}
 /*
  * Get effective group ID.  The "egid" is groups[0], and could be obtained
  * via getgroups.  This syscall exists because it is somewhat painful to do
  * correctly in a library function.
  */
 /* ARGSUSED */
 int
 sys_getegid(struct lwp *l, const void *v, register_t *retval)
+{
 	*retval = kauth_cred_getegid(l->l_cred);
 	return (0);
+}
 int
 sys_getgroups(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_getgroups_args *uap, register_t *retval)
+{
 	/* {
 		syscallarg(int) gidsetsize;
 		syscallarg(gid_t *) gidset;
 	} */
 	*retval = kauth_cred_ngroups(l->l_cred);
 	if (SCARG(uap, gidsetsize) == 0)
 		return 0;
-	if (SCARG(uap, gidsetsize) < 0)
+	if (SCARG(uap, gidsetsize) < (int)*retval)
 		return EINVAL;
 	if (SCARG(uap, gidsetsize) < *retval)
 		return EINVAL;
 	return kauth_cred_getgroups(l->l_cred, SCARG(uap, gidset), *retval,
 	    UIO_USERSPACE);
+}
 int
 sys_setsid(struct lwp *l, const void *v, register_t *retval)
+{
 	struct proc *p = l->l_proc;
 	int error;
 	error = proc_enterpgrp(p, p->p_pid, p->p_pid, true);
 	*retval = p->p_pid;
 	return (error);
+}
 /*
  * set process group (setpgid/old setpgrp)
+ *
  * caller does setpgid(targpid, targpgid)
+ *
  * pgid must be in valid range (EINVAL)
  * pid must be caller or child of caller (ESRCH)
  * if a child
  *	pid must be in same session (EPERM)
  *	pid can't have done an exec (EACCES)
  * if pgid != pid
  * 	there must exist some pid in same session having pgid (EPERM)
  * pid must not be session leader (EPERM)
+ *
  * Permission checks now in proc_enterpgrp()
  */
 int
 sys_setpgid(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_setpgid_args *uap,
     register_t *retval)
+{
 	/* {
 		syscallarg(int) pid;
 		syscallarg(int) pgid;
 	} */
 	struct proc *p = l->l_proc;
 	pid_t targp, pgid;
 	if (SCARG(uap, pgid) < 0)
 		return EINVAL;
 	if ((targp = SCARG(uap, pid)) == 0)
 		targp = p->p_pid;
 	if ((pgid = SCARG(uap, pgid)) == 0)
 		pgid = targp;
 	return proc_enterpgrp(p, targp, pgid, false);
+}
 /*
  * Set real, effective and saved uids to the requested values.
  * non-root callers can only ever change uids to values that match
  * one of the processes current uid values.
  * This is further restricted by the flags argument.
  */
 int
 do_setresuid(struct lwp *l, uid_t r, uid_t e, uid_t sv, u_int flags)
+{
 	struct proc *p = l->l_proc;
 	kauth_cred_t cred, ncred;
 	ncred = kauth_cred_alloc();
 	/* Get a write lock on the process credential. */
 	proc_crmod_enter();
 	cred = p->p_cred;
 	/*
 	 * Check that the new value is one of the allowed existing values,
 	 * or that we have root privilege.
 	 */
 	if ((r != -1
 	    && !((flags & ID_R_EQ_R) && r == kauth_cred_getuid(cred))
 	    && !((flags & ID_R_EQ_E) && r == kauth_cred_geteuid(cred))
 	    && !((flags & ID_R_EQ_S) && r == kauth_cred_getsvuid(cred))) ||
 	    (e != -1
 	    && !((flags & ID_E_EQ_R) && e == kauth_cred_getuid(cred))
 	    && !((flags & ID_E_EQ_E) && e == kauth_cred_geteuid(cred))
 	    && !((flags & ID_E_EQ_S) && e == kauth_cred_getsvuid(cred))) ||
 	    (sv != -1
 	    && !((flags & ID_S_EQ_R) && sv == kauth_cred_getuid(cred))
 	    && !((flags & ID_S_EQ_E) && sv == kauth_cred_geteuid(cred))
 	    && !((flags & ID_S_EQ_S) && sv == kauth_cred_getsvuid(cred)))) {
 		int error;
 		error = kauth_authorize_process(cred, KAUTH_PROCESS_SETID,
 		    p, NULL, NULL, NULL);
 		if (error != 0) {
 		 	proc_crmod_leave(cred, ncred, false);
 			return error;
+		}
+	}
 	/* If nothing has changed, short circuit the request */
 	if ((r == -1 || r == kauth_cred_getuid(cred))
 	    && (e == -1 || e == kauth_cred_geteuid(cred))
 	    && (sv == -1 || sv == kauth_cred_getsvuid(cred))) {
 		proc_crmod_leave(cred, ncred, false);
 		return 0;
+	}
 	kauth_cred_clone(cred, ncred);
 	if (r != -1 && r != kauth_cred_getuid(ncred)) {
 		/* Update count of processes for this user */
 		(void)chgproccnt(kauth_cred_getuid(ncred), -1);
 		(void)chgproccnt(r, 1);
 		kauth_cred_setuid(ncred, r);
+	}
 	if (sv != -1)
 		kauth_cred_setsvuid(ncred, sv);
 	if (e != -1)
 		kauth_cred_seteuid(ncred, e);
 	/* Broadcast our credentials to the process and other LWPs. */
  	proc_crmod_leave(ncred, cred, true);
 	return 0;
+}
 /*
  * Set real, effective and saved gids to the requested values.
  * non-root callers can only ever change gids to values that match
  * one of the processes current gid values.
  * This is further restricted by the flags argument.
  */
 int
 do_setresgid(struct lwp *l, gid_t r, gid_t e, gid_t sv, u_int flags)
+{
 	struct proc *p = l->l_proc;
 	kauth_cred_t cred, ncred;
 	ncred = kauth_cred_alloc();
 	/* Get a write lock on the process credential. */
 	proc_crmod_enter();
 	cred = p->p_cred;
 	/*
 	 * check new value is one of the allowed existing values.
 	 * otherwise, check if we have root privilege.
 	 */
 	if ((r != -1
 	    && !((flags & ID_R_EQ_R) && r == kauth_cred_getgid(cred))
 	    && !((flags & ID_R_EQ_E) && r == kauth_cred_getegid(cred))
 	    && !((flags & ID_R_EQ_S) && r == kauth_cred_getsvgid(cred))) ||
 	    (e != -1
 	    && !((flags & ID_E_EQ_R) && e == kauth_cred_getgid(cred))
 	    && !((flags & ID_E_EQ_E) && e == kauth_cred_getegid(cred))
 	    && !((flags & ID_E_EQ_S) && e == kauth_cred_getsvgid(cred))) ||
 	    (sv != -1
 	    && !((flags & ID_S_EQ_R) && sv == kauth_cred_getgid(cred))
 	    && !((flags & ID_S_EQ_E) && sv == kauth_cred_getegid(cred))
 	    && !((flags & ID_S_EQ_S) && sv == kauth_cred_getsvgid(cred)))) {
 		int error;
 		error = kauth_authorize_process(cred, KAUTH_PROCESS_SETID,
 		    p, NULL, NULL, NULL);
 		if (error != 0) {
 		 	proc_crmod_leave(cred, ncred, false);
 			return error;
+		}
+	}
 	/* If nothing has changed, short circuit the request */
 	if ((r == -1 || r == kauth_cred_getgid(cred))
 	    && (e == -1 || e == kauth_cred_getegid(cred))
 	    && (sv == -1 || sv == kauth_cred_getsvgid(cred))) {
 	 	proc_crmod_leave(cred, ncred, false);
 		return 0;
+	}
 	kauth_cred_clone(cred, ncred);
 	if (r != -1)
 		kauth_cred_setgid(ncred, r);
 	if (sv != -1)
 		kauth_cred_setsvgid(ncred, sv);
 	if (e != -1)
 		kauth_cred_setegid(ncred, e);
 	/* Broadcast our credentials to the process and other LWPs. */
  	proc_crmod_leave(ncred, cred, true);
 	return 0;
+}
 /* ARGSUSED */
 int
 sys_setuid(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_setuid_args *uap, register_t *retval)
+{
 	/* {
 		syscallarg(uid_t) uid;
 	} */
 	uid_t uid = SCARG(uap, uid);
 	return do_setresuid(l, uid, uid, uid,
 			    ID_R_EQ_R | ID_E_EQ_R | ID_S_EQ_R);
+}
 /* ARGSUSED */
 int
 sys_seteuid(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_seteuid_args *uap, register_t *retval)
+{
 	/* {
 		syscallarg(uid_t) euid;
 	} */
 	return do_setresuid(l, -1, SCARG(uap, euid), -1, ID_E_EQ_R | ID_E_EQ_S);
+}
 int
 sys_setreuid(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_setreuid_args *uap, register_t *retval)
+{
 	/* {
 		syscallarg(uid_t) ruid;
 		syscallarg(uid_t) euid;
 	} */
 	kauth_cred_t cred = l->l_cred;
 	uid_t ruid, euid, svuid;
 	ruid = SCARG(uap, ruid);
 	euid = SCARG(uap, euid);
 	if (ruid == -1)
 		ruid = kauth_cred_getuid(cred);
 	if (euid == -1)
 		euid = kauth_cred_geteuid(cred);
 	/* Saved uid is set to the new euid if the ruid changed */
 	svuid = (ruid == kauth_cred_getuid(cred)) ? -1 : euid;
 	return do_setresuid(l, ruid, euid, svuid,
 			    ID_R_EQ_R | ID_R_EQ_E |
 			    ID_E_EQ_R | ID_E_EQ_E | ID_E_EQ_S |
 			    ID_S_EQ_R | ID_S_EQ_E | ID_S_EQ_S);
+}
 /* ARGSUSED */
 int
 sys_setgid(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_setgid_args *uap, register_t *retval)
+{
 	/* {
 		syscallarg(gid_t) gid;
 	} */
 	gid_t gid = SCARG(uap, gid);
 	return do_setresgid(l, gid, gid, gid,
 			    ID_R_EQ_R | ID_E_EQ_R | ID_S_EQ_R);
+}
 /* ARGSUSED */
 int
 sys_setegid(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_setegid_args *uap, register_t *retval)
+{
 	/* {
 		syscallarg(gid_t) egid;
 	} */
 	return do_setresgid(l, -1, SCARG(uap, egid), -1, ID_E_EQ_R | ID_E_EQ_S);
+}
 int
 sys_setregid(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_setregid_args *uap, register_t *retval)
+{
 	/* {
 		syscallarg(gid_t) rgid;
 		syscallarg(gid_t) egid;
 	} */
 	kauth_cred_t cred = l->l_cred;
 	gid_t rgid, egid, svgid;
 	rgid = SCARG(uap, rgid);
 	egid = SCARG(uap, egid);
 	if (rgid == -1)
 		rgid = kauth_cred_getgid(cred);
 	if (egid == -1)
 		egid = kauth_cred_getegid(cred);
 	/* Saved gid is set to the new egid if the rgid changed */
 	svgid = rgid == kauth_cred_getgid(cred) ? -1 : egid;
 	return do_setresgid(l, rgid, egid, svgid,
 			ID_R_EQ_R | ID_R_EQ_E |
 			ID_E_EQ_R | ID_E_EQ_E | ID_E_EQ_S |
 			ID_S_EQ_R | ID_S_EQ_E | ID_S_EQ_S);
+}
 int
 sys_issetugid(struct lwp *l, const void *v, register_t *retval)
+{
 	struct proc *p = l->l_proc;
 	/*
 	 * Note: OpenBSD sets a P_SUGIDEXEC flag set at execve() time,
 	 * we use PK_SUGID because we consider changing the owners as
 	 * "tainting" as well.
 	 * This is significant for procs that start as root and "become"
 	 * a user without an exec - programs cannot know *everything*
 	 * that libc *might* have put in their data segment.
 	 */
 	*retval = (p->p_flag & PK_SUGID) != 0;
 	return (0);
+}
 /* ARGSUSED */
 int
 sys_setgroups(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_setgroups_args *uap, register_t *retval)
+{
 	/* {
 		syscallarg(int) gidsetsize;
 		syscallarg(const gid_t *) gidset;
 	} */
 	kauth_cred_t ncred;
 	int error;
 	ncred = kauth_cred_alloc();
 	error = kauth_cred_setgroups(ncred, SCARG(uap, gidset),
 	    SCARG(uap, gidsetsize), -1, UIO_USERSPACE);
 	if (error != 0) {
 		kauth_cred_free(ncred);
 		return error;
+	}
 	return kauth_proc_setgroups(l, ncred);
+}
 /*
  * Get login name, if available.
  */
 /* ARGSUSED */
 int
 sys___getlogin(struct lwp *l, const struct sys___getlogin_args *uap, register_t *retval)
+{
 	/* {
 		syscallarg(char *) namebuf;
 		syscallarg(size_t) namelen;
 	} */
 	struct proc *p = l->l_proc;
 	char login[sizeof(p->p_session->s_login)];
 	int namelen = SCARG(uap, namelen);
 	if (namelen > sizeof(login))
 		namelen = sizeof(login);
 	mutex_enter(proc_lock);
 	memcpy(login, p->p_session->s_login, namelen);
 	mutex_exit(proc_lock);
 	return (copyout(login, (void *)SCARG(uap, namebuf), namelen));
+}
 /*
  * Set login name.
  */
 /* ARGSUSED */
 int
 sys___setlogin(struct lwp *l, const struct sys___setlogin_args *uap, register_t *retval)
+{
 	/* {
 		syscallarg(const char *) namebuf;
 	} */
 	struct proc *p = l->l_proc;
 	struct session *sp;
 	char newname[sizeof sp->s_login + 1];
 	int error;
 	if ((error = kauth_authorize_process(l->l_cred, KAUTH_PROCESS_SETID,
 	    p, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != 0)
 		return (error);
 	error = copyinstr(SCARG(uap, namebuf), &newname, sizeof newname, NULL);
 	if (error != 0)
 		return (error == ENAMETOOLONG ? EINVAL : error);
 	mutex_enter(proc_lock);
 	sp = p->p_session;
 	if (sp->s_flags & S_LOGIN_SET && p->p_pid != sp->s_sid &&
 	    strncmp(newname, sp->s_login, sizeof sp->s_login) != 0)
 		log(LOG_WARNING, "%s (pid %d) changing logname from "
 		    "%.*s to %s\n", p->p_comm, p->p_pid,
 		    (int)sizeof sp->s_login, sp->s_login, newname);
 	sp->s_flags |= S_LOGIN_SET;
 	strncpy(sp->s_login, newname, sizeof sp->s_login);
 	mutex_exit(proc_lock);
 	return (0);
+}