Link [ pkgsrc | NetBSD | pkgsrc git mirror | PR fulltext-search | netbsd commit viewer ]


   
        usage: [branch:branch] [user:user] [path[@revision]] keyword [... [-excludekeyword [...]]] (e.g. branch:MAIN pkgtools/pkg)




switch to index mode

recent branches: MAIN (1h)  pkgsrc-2024Q1 (10d)  pkgsrc-2023Q4 (57d)  pkgsrc-2023Q2 (89d)  pkgsrc-2023Q3 (169d) 

2024-05-28 06:07:55 UTC Now

2023-02-07 16:34:42 UTC MAIN commitmail json YAML

openssl: Update to 1.1.1t.

Changes between 1.1.1s and 1.1.1t [7 Feb 2023]

*) Fixed X.400 address type confusion in X.509 GeneralName.

  There is a type confusion vulnerability relating to X.400 address processing
  inside an X.509 GeneralName. X.400 addresses were parsed as an ASN1_STRING
  but subsequently interpreted by GENERAL_NAME_cmp as an ASN1_TYPE. This
  vulnerability may allow an attacker who can provide a certificate chain and
  CRL (neither of which need have a valid signature) to pass arbitrary
  pointers to a memcmp call, creating a possible read primitive, subject to
  some constraints. Refer to the advisory for more information. Thanks to
  David Benjamin for discovering this issue. (CVE-2023-0286)

  This issue has been fixed by changing the public header file definition of
  GENERAL_NAME so that x400Address reflects the implementation. It was not
  possible for any existing application to successfully use the existing
  definition; however, if any application references the x400Address field
  (e.g. in dead code), note that the type of this field has changed. There is
  no ABI change.
  [Hugo Landau]

*) Fixed Use-after-free following BIO_new_NDEF.

  The public API function BIO_new_NDEF is a helper function used for
  streaming ASN.1 data via a BIO. It is primarily used internally to OpenSSL
  to support the SMIME, CMS and PKCS7 streaming capabilities, but may also
  be called directly by end user applications.

  The function receives a BIO from the caller, prepends a new BIO_f_asn1
  filter BIO onto the front of it to form a BIO chain, and then returns
  the new head of the BIO chain to the caller. Under certain conditions,
  for example if a CMS recipient public key is invalid, the new filter BIO
  is freed and the function returns a NULL result indicating a failure.
  However, in this case, the BIO chain is not properly cleaned up and the
  BIO passed by the caller still retains internal pointers to the previously
  freed filter BIO. If the caller then goes on to call BIO_pop() on the BIO
  then a use-after-free will occur. This will most likely result in a crash.
  (CVE-2023-0215)
  [Viktor Dukhovni, Matt Caswell]

*) Fixed Double free after calling PEM_read_bio_ex.

  The function PEM_read_bio_ex() reads a PEM file from a BIO and parses and
  decodes the "name" (e.g. "CERTIFICATE"), any header data and the payload
  data. If the function succeeds then the "name_out", "header" and "data"
  arguments are populated with pointers to buffers containing the relevant
  decoded data. The caller is responsible for freeing those buffers. It is
  possible to construct a PEM file that results in 0 bytes of payload data.
  In this case PEM_read_bio_ex() will return a failure code but will populate
  the header argument with a pointer to a buffer that has already been freed.
  If the caller also frees this buffer then a double free will occur. This
  will most likely lead to a crash.

  The functions PEM_read_bio() and PEM_read() are simple wrappers around
  PEM_read_bio_ex() and therefore these functions are also directly affected.

  These functions are also called indirectly by a number of other OpenSSL
  functions including PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio_ex() and
  SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo_file() which are also vulnerable. Some OpenSSL
  internal uses of these functions are not vulnerable because the caller does
  not free the header argument if PEM_read_bio_ex() returns a failure code.
  (CVE-2022-4450)
  [Kurt Roeckx, Matt Caswell]

*) Fixed Timing Oracle in RSA Decryption.

  A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption
  implementation which could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across
  a network in a Bleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful
  decryption an attacker would have to be able to send a very large number
  of trial messages for decryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA padding
  modes: PKCS#1 v1.5, RSA-OEAP and RSASVE.
  (CVE-2022-4304)
  [Dmitry Belyavsky, Hubert Kario]

(jperkin)