Received: by mail.netbsd.org (Postfix, from userid 605) id 05C6884DBA; Tue, 17 Oct 2017 08:42:35 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.netbsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 82DD484D99 for ; Tue, 17 Oct 2017 08:42:34 +0000 (UTC) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at netbsd.org Received: from mail.netbsd.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mail.netbsd.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10025) with ESMTP id TPXDMeFLCPyI for ; Tue, 17 Oct 2017 08:42:30 +0000 (UTC) Received: from cvs.NetBSD.org (ivanova.NetBSD.org [IPv6:2001:470:a085:999:28c:faff:fe03:5984]) by mail.netbsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D475F84D2E for ; Tue, 17 Oct 2017 08:42:30 +0000 (UTC) Received: by cvs.NetBSD.org (Postfix, from userid 500) id CB8A1FBC7; Tue, 17 Oct 2017 08:42:30 +0000 (UTC) Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="_----------=_1508229750117390" MIME-Version: 1.0 Date: Tue, 17 Oct 2017 08:42:30 +0000 From: "Manuel Bouyer" Subject: CVS commit: pkgsrc/sysutils To: pkgsrc-changes@NetBSD.org Reply-To: bouyer@netbsd.org X-Mailer: log_accum Message-Id: <20171017084230.CB8A1FBC7@cvs.NetBSD.org> Sender: pkgsrc-changes-owner@NetBSD.org List-Id: pkgsrc-changes.NetBSD.org Precedence: bulk List-Unsubscribe: This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --_----------=_1508229750117390 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII" Module Name: pkgsrc Committed By: bouyer Date: Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 UTC 2017 Modified Files: pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48: MESSAGE Makefile distinfo pkgsrc/sysutils/xentools48: Makefile distinfo Added Files: pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches: patch-XSA231 patch-XSA232 patch-XSA234 patch-XSA237 patch-XSA238 patch-XSA239 patch-XSA240 patch-XSA241 patch-XSA242 patch-XSA243 patch-XSA244 pkgsrc/sysutils/xentools48/patches: patch-XSA233 patch-XSA240 Removed Files: pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches: patch-XSA-212 pkgsrc/sysutils/xentools48/patches: patch-XSA-211-1 patch-XSA-211-2 Log Message: Update xentools48 and xenkernel48 to 4.8.2, and apply security patches up to XSA244. Keep PKGREVISION to 1 to account for the fact that it's not a stock Xen 4.8.2. Note that, unlike upstream, pv-linear-pt defaults to true, so that NetBSD PV guests (including dom0) will continue to boot without changes to boot.cfg To generate a diff of this commit: cvs rdiff -u -r1.1 -r1.2 pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/MESSAGE cvs rdiff -u -r1.5 -r1.6 pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/Makefile cvs rdiff -u -r1.2 -r1.3 pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/distinfo cvs rdiff -u -r1.1 -r0 pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA-212 cvs rdiff -u -r0 -r1.1 pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA231 \ pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA232 \ pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA234 \ pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA237 \ pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA238 \ pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA239 \ pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA240 \ pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA241 \ pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA242 \ pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA243 \ pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA244 cvs rdiff -u -r1.7 -r1.8 pkgsrc/sysutils/xentools48/Makefile cvs rdiff -u -r1.3 -r1.4 pkgsrc/sysutils/xentools48/distinfo cvs rdiff -u -r1.1 -r0 pkgsrc/sysutils/xentools48/patches/patch-XSA-211-1 \ pkgsrc/sysutils/xentools48/patches/patch-XSA-211-2 cvs rdiff -u -r0 -r1.1 pkgsrc/sysutils/xentools48/patches/patch-XSA233 \ pkgsrc/sysutils/xentools48/patches/patch-XSA240 Please note that diffs are not public domain; they are subject to the copyright notices on the relevant files. --_----------=_1508229750117390 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Length: 78865 Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary Content-Type: text/x-diff; charset=utf-8 Modified files: Index: pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/MESSAGE diff -u pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/MESSAGE:1.1 pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/MESSAGE:1.2 --- pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/MESSAGE:1.1 Thu Mar 30 09:15:09 2017 +++ pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/MESSAGE Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 2017 @@ -1,7 +1,11 @@ =========================================================================== -$NetBSD: MESSAGE,v 1.1 2017/03/30 09:15:09 bouyer Exp $ +$NetBSD: MESSAGE,v 1.2 2017/10/17 08:42:30 bouyer Exp $ The Xen hypervisor is installed under the following locations: ${XENKERNELDIR}/xen.gz (standard hypervisor) ${XENKERNELDIR}/xen-debug.gz (debug hypervisor) + +Note that unlike upstream Xen, pv-linear-pt defaults to true. +You can disable it using pv-linear-pt=false on the Xen command line, +but then you can't boot NetBSD in PV mode. =========================================================================== Index: pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/Makefile diff -u pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/Makefile:1.5 pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/Makefile:1.6 --- pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/Makefile:1.5 Mon Jul 24 08:53:45 2017 +++ pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/Makefile Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 2017 @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ -# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.5 2017/07/24 08:53:45 maya Exp $ +# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.6 2017/10/17 08:42:30 bouyer Exp $ -VERSION= 4.8.0 +VERSION= 4.8.2 DISTNAME= xen-${VERSION} PKGNAME= xenkernel48-${VERSION} PKGREVISION= 1 Index: pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/distinfo diff -u pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/distinfo:1.2 pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/distinfo:1.3 --- pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/distinfo:1.2 Sat Apr 8 12:30:42 2017 +++ pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/distinfo Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 2017 @@ -1,11 +1,21 @@ -$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.2 2017/04/08 12:30:42 spz Exp $ +$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.3 2017/10/17 08:42:30 bouyer Exp $ -SHA1 (xen48/xen-4.8.0.tar.gz) = c2403899b13e1e8b8da391aceecbfc932d583a88 -RMD160 (xen48/xen-4.8.0.tar.gz) = b79b1e2587caa9c6fe68d2996a4fd42f95c1fe7b -SHA512 (xen48/xen-4.8.0.tar.gz) = 70b95553f9813573b12e52999a4df8701dec430f23c36a8dc70d25a46bb4bc9234e5b7feb74a04062af4c8d6b6bcfe947d90b2b172416206812e54bac9797454 -Size (xen48/xen-4.8.0.tar.gz) = 22499917 bytes +SHA1 (xen48/xen-4.8.2.tar.gz) = 184c57ce9e71e34b3cbdd318524021f44946efbe +RMD160 (xen48/xen-4.8.2.tar.gz) = f4126cb0f7ff427ed7d20ce399dcd1077c599343 +SHA512 (xen48/xen-4.8.2.tar.gz) = 7805531f73d23ecfff3439770e62d387f4254a444875670d53a0a739323e5d4d8f8fcc478f8936ee1ae8aff3e0229549e47c01c606365a8ce060dd5c503e87da +Size (xen48/xen-4.8.2.tar.gz) = 22522336 bytes SHA1 (patch-Config.mk) = abf55aa58792315e758ee3785a763cfa8c2da68f -SHA1 (patch-XSA-212) = 4637d51bcbb3b11fb0e22940f824ebacdaa15b4f +SHA1 (patch-XSA231) = fc249a68ea53064ff7d95f24380f66f3fc3393e7 +SHA1 (patch-XSA232) = 86d633941ac3165ca4034db660a48d60384ea252 +SHA1 (patch-XSA234) = acf4170a410d9f314c0cc0c5c092db6bb6cc69a0 +SHA1 (patch-XSA237) = 3125554b155bd650480934a37d89d1a7471dfb20 +SHA1 (patch-XSA238) = 58b6fcb73d314d7f06256ed3769210e49197aa90 +SHA1 (patch-XSA239) = 10619718e8a1536a7f52eb3838cdb490e6ba8c97 +SHA1 (patch-XSA240) = dca90d33d30167edbe07071795f18159e3e20c57 +SHA1 (patch-XSA241) = b506425ca7382190435df6f96800cb0a24aff23e +SHA1 (patch-XSA242) = afff314771d78ee2482aec3b7693c12bfe00e0ec +SHA1 (patch-XSA243) = 75eef49628bc0b3bd4fe8b023cb2da75928103a7 +SHA1 (patch-XSA244) = 2739ff8a920630088853a9076f71ca2caf639320 SHA1 (patch-xen_Makefile) = be3f4577a205b23187b91319f91c50720919f70b SHA1 (patch-xen_Rules.mk) = 5f33a667bae67c85d997a968c0f8b014b707d13c SHA1 (patch-xen_arch_x86_Rules.mk) = e2d148fb308c37c047ca41a678471217b6166977 Index: pkgsrc/sysutils/xentools48/Makefile diff -u pkgsrc/sysutils/xentools48/Makefile:1.7 pkgsrc/sysutils/xentools48/Makefile:1.8 --- pkgsrc/sysutils/xentools48/Makefile:1.7 Fri Sep 8 09:51:25 2017 +++ pkgsrc/sysutils/xentools48/Makefile Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 2017 @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ -# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.7 2017/09/08 09:51:25 jaapb Exp $ +# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.8 2017/10/17 08:42:30 bouyer Exp $ # -VERSION= 4.8.0 +VERSION= 4.8.2 VERSION_IPXE= 827dd1bfee67daa683935ce65316f7e0f057fe1c DIST_IPXE= ipxe-git-${VERSION_IPXE}.tar.gz DIST_NEWLIB= newlib-1.16.0.tar.gz @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ DIST_LIBPCI= pciutils-2.2.9.tar.bz2 DIST_SUBDIR= xen48 DISTNAME= xen-${VERSION} PKGNAME= xentools48-${VERSION} -PKGREVISION= 3 +PKGREVISION= 1 CATEGORIES= sysutils MASTER_SITES= https://downloads.xenproject.org/release/xen/${VERSION}/ Index: pkgsrc/sysutils/xentools48/distinfo diff -u pkgsrc/sysutils/xentools48/distinfo:1.3 pkgsrc/sysutils/xentools48/distinfo:1.4 --- pkgsrc/sysutils/xentools48/distinfo:1.3 Wed Aug 23 03:02:14 2017 +++ pkgsrc/sysutils/xentools48/distinfo Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 2017 @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.3 2017/08/23 03:02:14 maya Exp $ +$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.4 2017/10/17 08:42:30 bouyer Exp $ SHA1 (xen48/gmp-4.3.2.tar.bz2) = c011e8feaf1bb89158bd55eaabd7ef8fdd101a2c RMD160 (xen48/gmp-4.3.2.tar.bz2) = a8f3f41501ece290c348aeb4444bbea40bc53e71 @@ -36,10 +36,10 @@ SHA1 (xen48/tpm_emulator-0.7.4.tar.gz) = RMD160 (xen48/tpm_emulator-0.7.4.tar.gz) = ded71632d316126138f2db4a5f2051b2489ae5ff SHA512 (xen48/tpm_emulator-0.7.4.tar.gz) = 4928b5b82f57645be9408362706ff2c4d9baa635b21b0d41b1c82930e8c60a759b1ea4fa74d7e6c7cae1b7692d006aa5cb72df0c3b88bf049779aa2b566f9d35 Size (xen48/tpm_emulator-0.7.4.tar.gz) = 214145 bytes -SHA1 (xen48/xen-4.8.0.tar.gz) = c2403899b13e1e8b8da391aceecbfc932d583a88 -RMD160 (xen48/xen-4.8.0.tar.gz) = b79b1e2587caa9c6fe68d2996a4fd42f95c1fe7b -SHA512 (xen48/xen-4.8.0.tar.gz) = 70b95553f9813573b12e52999a4df8701dec430f23c36a8dc70d25a46bb4bc9234e5b7feb74a04062af4c8d6b6bcfe947d90b2b172416206812e54bac9797454 -Size (xen48/xen-4.8.0.tar.gz) = 22499917 bytes +SHA1 (xen48/xen-4.8.2.tar.gz) = 184c57ce9e71e34b3cbdd318524021f44946efbe +RMD160 (xen48/xen-4.8.2.tar.gz) = f4126cb0f7ff427ed7d20ce399dcd1077c599343 +SHA512 (xen48/xen-4.8.2.tar.gz) = 7805531f73d23ecfff3439770e62d387f4254a444875670d53a0a739323e5d4d8f8fcc478f8936ee1ae8aff3e0229549e47c01c606365a8ce060dd5c503e87da +Size (xen48/xen-4.8.2.tar.gz) = 22522336 bytes SHA1 (xen48/zlib-1.2.3.tar.gz) = 60faeaaf250642db5c0ea36cd6dcc9f99c8f3902 RMD160 (xen48/zlib-1.2.3.tar.gz) = 89a57e336c24f7f6eebda3a1724e14b71187e117 SHA512 (xen48/zlib-1.2.3.tar.gz) = 021b958fcd0d346c4ba761bcf0cc40f3522de6186cf5a0a6ea34a70504ce9622b1c2626fce40675bc8282cf5f5ade18473656abc38050f72f5d6480507a2106e @@ -50,8 +50,8 @@ SHA1 (patch-.._newlib-1.16.0_newlib_libc SHA1 (patch-._stubdom_vtpmmgr_tpm2_marshal.h) = 30c747a53e848387e4c8d6f4dcbcab7d1b46ed12 SHA1 (patch-Config.mk) = 7976ce94c553c2fc6badc6d41e9cb8334fea40c8 SHA1 (patch-Makefile) = fdcd5fbb22613e55ac1b000a46b1ecbbd99eef59 -SHA1 (patch-XSA-211-1) = df96b8992148e442a887715ccca741b948fbb0f5 -SHA1 (patch-XSA-211-2) = c860da3631c1c7988f9bb150020935859c6b061f +SHA1 (patch-XSA233) = e6a7230035966d7d292ef3ca477f2eb3458ae12f +SHA1 (patch-XSA240) = 754bbe5080a81e1526b7938fed01ba435e65e50b SHA1 (patch-docs_man_xl.cfg.pod.5.in) = e1ee6f2d48f6ce001c44c7ac688ea179b625b584 SHA1 (patch-docs_man_xl.conf.pod.5) = d77e3313750db315d540d7713c95cd54d6f02938 SHA1 (patch-docs_man_xl.pod.1.in) = 9b37ef724f2827bc05110e5456a8668257509cab Added files: Index: pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA231 diff -u /dev/null pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA231:1.1 --- /dev/null Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 2017 +++ pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA231 Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 2017 @@ -0,0 +1,110 @@ +$NetBSD: patch-XSA231,v 1.1 2017/10/17 08:42:30 bouyer Exp $ + +From: George Dunlap +Subject: xen/mm: make sure node is less than MAX_NUMNODES + +The output of MEMF_get_node(memflags) can be as large as nodeid_t can +hold (currently 255). This is then used as an index to arrays of size +MAX_NUMNODE, which is 64 on x86 and 1 on ARM, can be passed in by an +untrusted guest (via memory_exchange and increase_reservation) and is +not currently bounds-checked. + +Check the value in page_alloc.c before using it, and also check the +value in the hypercall call sites and return -EINVAL if appropriate. +Don't permit domains other than the hardware or control domain to +allocate node-constrained memory. + +This is XSA-231. + +Reported-by: Matthew Daley +Signed-off-by: George Dunlap +Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich +Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper + +--- xen/common/memory.c.orig ++++ xen/common/memory.c +@@ -411,6 +411,31 @@ static void decrease_reservation(struct + a->nr_done = i; + } + ++static bool propagate_node(unsigned int xmf, unsigned int *memflags) ++{ ++ const struct domain *currd = current->domain; ++ ++ BUILD_BUG_ON(XENMEMF_get_node(0) != NUMA_NO_NODE); ++ BUILD_BUG_ON(MEMF_get_node(0) != NUMA_NO_NODE); ++ ++ if ( XENMEMF_get_node(xmf) == NUMA_NO_NODE ) ++ return true; ++ ++ if ( is_hardware_domain(currd) || is_control_domain(currd) ) ++ { ++ if ( XENMEMF_get_node(xmf) >= MAX_NUMNODES ) ++ return false; ++ ++ *memflags |= MEMF_node(XENMEMF_get_node(xmf)); ++ if ( xmf & XENMEMF_exact_node_request ) ++ *memflags |= MEMF_exact_node; ++ } ++ else if ( xmf & XENMEMF_exact_node_request ) ++ return false; ++ ++ return true; ++} ++ + static long memory_exchange(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_memory_exchange_t) arg) + { + struct xen_memory_exchange exch; +@@ -483,6 +508,12 @@ static long memory_exchange(XEN_GUEST_HA + } + } + ++ if ( unlikely(!propagate_node(exch.out.mem_flags, &memflags)) ) ++ { ++ rc = -EINVAL; ++ goto fail_early; ++ } ++ + d = rcu_lock_domain_by_any_id(exch.in.domid); + if ( d == NULL ) + { +@@ -501,7 +532,6 @@ static long memory_exchange(XEN_GUEST_HA + d, + XENMEMF_get_address_bits(exch.out.mem_flags) ? : + (BITS_PER_LONG+PAGE_SHIFT))); +- memflags |= MEMF_node(XENMEMF_get_node(exch.out.mem_flags)); + + for ( i = (exch.nr_exchanged >> in_chunk_order); + i < (exch.in.nr_extents >> in_chunk_order); +@@ -864,12 +894,8 @@ static int construct_memop_from_reservat + } + read_unlock(&d->vnuma_rwlock); + } +- else +- { +- a->memflags |= MEMF_node(XENMEMF_get_node(r->mem_flags)); +- if ( r->mem_flags & XENMEMF_exact_node_request ) +- a->memflags |= MEMF_exact_node; +- } ++ else if ( unlikely(!propagate_node(r->mem_flags, &a->memflags)) ) ++ return -EINVAL; + + return 0; + } +--- xen/common/page_alloc.c.orig ++++ xen/common/page_alloc.c +@@ -706,9 +706,13 @@ static struct page_info *alloc_heap_page + if ( node >= MAX_NUMNODES ) + node = cpu_to_node(smp_processor_id()); + } ++ else if ( unlikely(node >= MAX_NUMNODES) ) ++ { ++ ASSERT_UNREACHABLE(); ++ return NULL; ++ } + first_node = node; + +- ASSERT(node < MAX_NUMNODES); + ASSERT(zone_lo <= zone_hi); + ASSERT(zone_hi < NR_ZONES); + Index: pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA232 diff -u /dev/null pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA232:1.1 --- /dev/null Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 2017 +++ pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA232 Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 2017 @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +$NetBSD: patch-XSA232,v 1.1 2017/10/17 08:42:30 bouyer Exp $ + +From: Andrew Cooper +Subject: grant_table: fix GNTTABOP_cache_flush handling + +Don't fall over a NULL grant_table pointer when the owner of the domain +is a system domain (DOMID_{XEN,IO} etc). + +This is XSA-232. + +Reported-by: Matthew Daley +Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper +Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich + +--- xen/common/grant_table.c.orig ++++ xen/common/grant_table.c +@@ -3053,7 +3053,7 @@ static int cache_flush(gnttab_cache_flus + + page = mfn_to_page(mfn); + owner = page_get_owner_and_reference(page); +- if ( !owner ) ++ if ( !owner || !owner->grant_table ) + { + rcu_unlock_domain(d); + return -EPERM; Index: pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA234 diff -u /dev/null pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA234:1.1 --- /dev/null Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 2017 +++ pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA234 Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 2017 @@ -0,0 +1,187 @@ +$NetBSD: patch-XSA234,v 1.1 2017/10/17 08:42:30 bouyer Exp $ + +From: Jan Beulich +Subject: gnttab: also validate PTE permissions upon destroy/replace + +In order for PTE handling to match up with the reference counting done +by common code, presence and writability of grant mapping PTEs must +also be taken into account; validating just the frame number is not +enough. This is in particular relevant if a guest fiddles with grant +PTEs via non-grant hypercalls. + +Note that the flags being passed to replace_grant_host_mapping() +already happen to be those of the existing mapping, so no new function +parameter is needed. + +This is XSA-234. + +Reported-by: Andrew Cooper +Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich +Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper + +--- xen/arch/x86/mm.c.orig ++++ xen/arch/x86/mm.c +@@ -4017,7 +4017,8 @@ static int create_grant_pte_mapping( + } + + static int destroy_grant_pte_mapping( +- uint64_t addr, unsigned long frame, struct domain *d) ++ uint64_t addr, unsigned long frame, unsigned int grant_pte_flags, ++ struct domain *d) + { + int rc = GNTST_okay; + void *va; +@@ -4063,16 +4064,27 @@ static int destroy_grant_pte_mapping( + + ol1e = *(l1_pgentry_t *)va; + +- /* Check that the virtual address supplied is actually mapped to frame. */ +- if ( unlikely(l1e_get_pfn(ol1e) != frame) ) ++ /* ++ * Check that the PTE supplied actually maps frame (with appropriate ++ * permissions). ++ */ ++ if ( unlikely(l1e_get_pfn(ol1e) != frame) || ++ unlikely((l1e_get_flags(ol1e) ^ grant_pte_flags) & ++ (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW)) ) + { + page_unlock(page); +- MEM_LOG("PTE entry %lx for address %"PRIx64" doesn't match frame %lx", +- (unsigned long)l1e_get_intpte(ol1e), addr, frame); ++ MEM_LOG("PTE %"PRIpte" at %"PRIx64" doesn't match grant (%"PRIpte")", ++ l1e_get_intpte(ol1e), addr, ++ l1e_get_intpte(l1e_from_pfn(frame, grant_pte_flags))); + rc = GNTST_general_error; + goto failed; + } + ++ if ( unlikely((l1e_get_flags(ol1e) ^ grant_pte_flags) & ++ ~(_PAGE_AVAIL | PAGE_CACHE_ATTRS)) ) ++ MEM_LOG("PTE flags %x at %"PRIx64" don't match grant (%x)\n", ++ l1e_get_flags(ol1e), addr, grant_pte_flags); ++ + /* Delete pagetable entry. */ + if ( unlikely(!UPDATE_ENTRY + (l1, +@@ -4081,7 +4093,7 @@ static int destroy_grant_pte_mapping( + 0)) ) + { + page_unlock(page); +- MEM_LOG("Cannot delete PTE entry at %p", va); ++ MEM_LOG("Cannot delete PTE entry at %"PRIx64, addr); + rc = GNTST_general_error; + goto failed; + } +@@ -4149,7 +4161,8 @@ static int create_grant_va_mapping( + } + + static int replace_grant_va_mapping( +- unsigned long addr, unsigned long frame, l1_pgentry_t nl1e, struct vcpu *v) ++ unsigned long addr, unsigned long frame, unsigned int grant_pte_flags, ++ l1_pgentry_t nl1e, struct vcpu *v) + { + l1_pgentry_t *pl1e, ol1e; + unsigned long gl1mfn; +@@ -4185,19 +4198,30 @@ static int replace_grant_va_mapping( + + ol1e = *pl1e; + +- /* Check that the virtual address supplied is actually mapped to frame. */ +- if ( unlikely(l1e_get_pfn(ol1e) != frame) ) +- { +- MEM_LOG("PTE entry %lx for address %lx doesn't match frame %lx", +- l1e_get_pfn(ol1e), addr, frame); ++ /* ++ * Check that the virtual address supplied is actually mapped to frame ++ * (with appropriate permissions). ++ */ ++ if ( unlikely(l1e_get_pfn(ol1e) != frame) || ++ unlikely((l1e_get_flags(ol1e) ^ grant_pte_flags) & ++ (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW)) ) ++ { ++ MEM_LOG("PTE %"PRIpte" for %lx doesn't match grant (%"PRIpte")", ++ l1e_get_intpte(ol1e), addr, ++ l1e_get_intpte(l1e_from_pfn(frame, grant_pte_flags))); + rc = GNTST_general_error; + goto unlock_and_out; + } + ++ if ( unlikely((l1e_get_flags(ol1e) ^ grant_pte_flags) & ++ ~(_PAGE_AVAIL | PAGE_CACHE_ATTRS)) ) ++ MEM_LOG("PTE flags %x for %"PRIx64" don't match grant (%x)", ++ l1e_get_flags(ol1e), addr, grant_pte_flags); ++ + /* Delete pagetable entry. */ + if ( unlikely(!UPDATE_ENTRY(l1, pl1e, ol1e, nl1e, gl1mfn, v, 0)) ) + { +- MEM_LOG("Cannot delete PTE entry at %p", (unsigned long *)pl1e); ++ MEM_LOG("Cannot delete PTE entry for %"PRIx64, addr); + rc = GNTST_general_error; + goto unlock_and_out; + } +@@ -4211,9 +4235,11 @@ static int replace_grant_va_mapping( + } + + static int destroy_grant_va_mapping( +- unsigned long addr, unsigned long frame, struct vcpu *v) ++ unsigned long addr, unsigned long frame, unsigned int grant_pte_flags, ++ struct vcpu *v) + { +- return replace_grant_va_mapping(addr, frame, l1e_empty(), v); ++ return replace_grant_va_mapping(addr, frame, grant_pte_flags, ++ l1e_empty(), v); + } + + static int create_grant_p2m_mapping(uint64_t addr, unsigned long frame, +@@ -4307,21 +4333,40 @@ int replace_grant_host_mapping( + unsigned long gl1mfn; + struct page_info *l1pg; + int rc; ++ unsigned int grant_pte_flags; + + if ( paging_mode_external(current->domain) ) + return replace_grant_p2m_mapping(addr, frame, new_addr, flags); + ++ grant_pte_flags = ++ _PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_GNTTAB | _PAGE_NX; ++ ++ if ( flags & GNTMAP_application_map ) ++ grant_pte_flags |= _PAGE_USER; ++ if ( !(flags & GNTMAP_readonly) ) ++ grant_pte_flags |= _PAGE_RW; ++ /* ++ * On top of the explicit settings done by create_grant_host_mapping() ++ * also open-code relevant parts of adjust_guest_l1e(). Don't mirror ++ * available and cachability flags, though. ++ */ ++ if ( !is_pv_32bit_domain(curr->domain) ) ++ grant_pte_flags |= (grant_pte_flags & _PAGE_USER) ++ ? _PAGE_GLOBAL ++ : _PAGE_GUEST_KERNEL | _PAGE_USER; ++ + if ( flags & GNTMAP_contains_pte ) + { + if ( !new_addr ) +- return destroy_grant_pte_mapping(addr, frame, curr->domain); ++ return destroy_grant_pte_mapping(addr, frame, grant_pte_flags, ++ curr->domain); + + MEM_LOG("Unsupported grant table operation"); + return GNTST_general_error; + } + + if ( !new_addr ) +- return destroy_grant_va_mapping(addr, frame, curr); ++ return destroy_grant_va_mapping(addr, frame, grant_pte_flags, curr); + + pl1e = guest_map_l1e(new_addr, &gl1mfn); + if ( !pl1e ) +@@ -4369,7 +4414,7 @@ int replace_grant_host_mapping( + put_page(l1pg); + guest_unmap_l1e(pl1e); + +- rc = replace_grant_va_mapping(addr, frame, ol1e, curr); ++ rc = replace_grant_va_mapping(addr, frame, grant_pte_flags, ol1e, curr); + if ( rc && !paging_mode_refcounts(curr->domain) ) + put_page_from_l1e(ol1e, curr->domain); + Index: pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA237 diff -u /dev/null pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA237:1.1 --- /dev/null Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 2017 +++ pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA237 Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 2017 @@ -0,0 +1,311 @@ +$NetBSD: patch-XSA237,v 1.1 2017/10/17 08:42:30 bouyer Exp $ + +From: Jan Beulich +Subject: x86: don't allow MSI pIRQ mapping on unowned device + +MSI setup should be permitted only for existing devices owned by the +respective guest (the operation may still be carried out by the domain +controlling that guest). + +This is part of XSA-237. + +Reported-by: HW42 +Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich +Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper + +--- xen/arch/x86/irq.c.orig ++++ xen/arch/x86/irq.c +@@ -1964,7 +1964,10 @@ int map_domain_pirq( + if ( !cpu_has_apic ) + goto done; + +- pdev = pci_get_pdev(msi->seg, msi->bus, msi->devfn); ++ pdev = pci_get_pdev_by_domain(d, msi->seg, msi->bus, msi->devfn); ++ if ( !pdev ) ++ goto done; ++ + ret = pci_enable_msi(msi, &msi_desc); + if ( ret ) + { +From: Jan Beulich +Subject: x86: enforce proper privilege when (un)mapping pIRQ-s + +(Un)mapping of IRQs, just like other RESOURCE__ADD* / RESOURCE__REMOVE* +actions (in FLASK terms) should be XSM_DM_PRIV rather than XSM_TARGET. +This in turn requires bypassing the XSM check in physdev_unmap_pirq() +for the HVM emuirq case just like is being done in physdev_map_pirq(). +The primary goal security wise, however, is to no longer allow HVM +guests, by specifying their own domain ID instead of DOMID_SELF, to +enter code paths intended for PV guest and the control domains of HVM +guests only. + +This is part of XSA-237. + +Reported-by: HW42 +Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich +Reviewed-by: George Dunlap + +--- xen/arch/x86/physdev.c.orig ++++ xen/arch/x86/physdev.c +@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ int physdev_map_pirq(domid_t domid, int + if ( d == NULL ) + return -ESRCH; + +- ret = xsm_map_domain_pirq(XSM_TARGET, d); ++ ret = xsm_map_domain_pirq(XSM_DM_PRIV, d); + if ( ret ) + goto free_domain; + +@@ -255,13 +255,14 @@ int physdev_map_pirq(domid_t domid, int + int physdev_unmap_pirq(domid_t domid, int pirq) + { + struct domain *d; +- int ret; ++ int ret = 0; + + d = rcu_lock_domain_by_any_id(domid); + if ( d == NULL ) + return -ESRCH; + +- ret = xsm_unmap_domain_pirq(XSM_TARGET, d); ++ if ( domid != DOMID_SELF || !is_hvm_domain(d) ) ++ ret = xsm_unmap_domain_pirq(XSM_DM_PRIV, d); + if ( ret ) + goto free_domain; + +--- xen/include/xsm/dummy.h.orig ++++ xen/include/xsm/dummy.h +@@ -453,7 +453,7 @@ static XSM_INLINE char *xsm_show_irq_sid + + static XSM_INLINE int xsm_map_domain_pirq(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d) + { +- XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_TARGET); ++ XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_DM_PRIV); + return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d); + } + +@@ -465,7 +465,7 @@ static XSM_INLINE int xsm_map_domain_irq + + static XSM_INLINE int xsm_unmap_domain_pirq(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d) + { +- XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_TARGET); ++ XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_DM_PRIV); + return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d); + } + +From: Jan Beulich +Subject: x86/MSI: disallow redundant enabling + +At the moment, Xen attempts to allow redundant enabling of MSI by +having pci_enable_msi() return 0, and point to the existing MSI +descriptor, when the msi already exists. + +Unfortunately, if subsequent errors are encountered, the cleanup +paths assume pci_enable_msi() had done full initialization, and +hence undo everything that was assumed to be done by that +function without also undoing other setup that would normally +occur only after that function was called (in map_domain_pirq() +itself). + +Rather than try to make the redundant enabling case work properly, just +forbid it entirely by having pci_enable_msi() return -EEXIST when MSI +is already set up. + +This is part of XSA-237. + +Reported-by: HW42 +Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich +Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper +Reviewed-by: George Dunlap + +--- xen/arch/x86/msi.c.orig ++++ xen/arch/x86/msi.c +@@ -1050,11 +1050,10 @@ static int __pci_enable_msi(struct msi_i + old_desc = find_msi_entry(pdev, msi->irq, PCI_CAP_ID_MSI); + if ( old_desc ) + { +- printk(XENLOG_WARNING "irq %d already mapped to MSI on %04x:%02x:%02x.%u\n", ++ printk(XENLOG_ERR "irq %d already mapped to MSI on %04x:%02x:%02x.%u\n", + msi->irq, msi->seg, msi->bus, + PCI_SLOT(msi->devfn), PCI_FUNC(msi->devfn)); +- *desc = old_desc; +- return 0; ++ return -EEXIST; + } + + old_desc = find_msi_entry(pdev, -1, PCI_CAP_ID_MSIX); +@@ -1118,11 +1117,10 @@ static int __pci_enable_msix(struct msi_ + old_desc = find_msi_entry(pdev, msi->irq, PCI_CAP_ID_MSIX); + if ( old_desc ) + { +- printk(XENLOG_WARNING "irq %d already mapped to MSI-X on %04x:%02x:%02x.%u\n", ++ printk(XENLOG_ERR "irq %d already mapped to MSI-X on %04x:%02x:%02x.%u\n", + msi->irq, msi->seg, msi->bus, + PCI_SLOT(msi->devfn), PCI_FUNC(msi->devfn)); +- *desc = old_desc; +- return 0; ++ return -EEXIST; + } + + old_desc = find_msi_entry(pdev, -1, PCI_CAP_ID_MSI); +From: Jan Beulich +Subject: x86/IRQ: conditionally preserve irq <-> pirq mapping on map error paths + +Mappings that had been set up before should not be torn down when +handling unrelated errors. + +This is part of XSA-237. + +Reported-by: HW42 +Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich +Reviewed-by: George Dunlap + +--- xen/arch/x86/irq.c.orig ++++ xen/arch/x86/irq.c +@@ -1252,7 +1252,8 @@ static int prepare_domain_irq_pirq(struc + return -ENOMEM; + } + *pinfo = info; +- return 0; ++ ++ return !!err; + } + + static void set_domain_irq_pirq(struct domain *d, int irq, struct pirq *pirq) +@@ -1295,7 +1296,10 @@ int init_domain_irq_mapping(struct domai + continue; + err = prepare_domain_irq_pirq(d, i, i, &info); + if ( err ) ++ { ++ ASSERT(err < 0); + break; ++ } + set_domain_irq_pirq(d, i, info); + } + +@@ -1903,6 +1907,7 @@ int map_domain_pirq( + struct pirq *info; + struct irq_desc *desc; + unsigned long flags; ++ DECLARE_BITMAP(prepared, MAX_MSI_IRQS) = {}; + + ASSERT(spin_is_locked(&d->event_lock)); + +@@ -1946,8 +1951,10 @@ int map_domain_pirq( + } + + ret = prepare_domain_irq_pirq(d, irq, pirq, &info); +- if ( ret ) ++ if ( ret < 0 ) + goto revoke; ++ if ( !ret ) ++ __set_bit(0, prepared); + + desc = irq_to_desc(irq); + +@@ -2019,8 +2026,10 @@ int map_domain_pirq( + irq = create_irq(NUMA_NO_NODE); + ret = irq >= 0 ? prepare_domain_irq_pirq(d, irq, pirq + nr, &info) + : irq; +- if ( ret ) ++ if ( ret < 0 ) + break; ++ if ( !ret ) ++ __set_bit(nr, prepared); + msi_desc[nr].irq = irq; + + if ( irq_permit_access(d, irq) != 0 ) +@@ -2053,15 +2062,15 @@ int map_domain_pirq( + desc->msi_desc = NULL; + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&desc->lock, flags); + } +- while ( nr-- ) ++ while ( nr ) + { + if ( irq >= 0 && irq_deny_access(d, irq) ) + printk(XENLOG_G_ERR + "dom%d: could not revoke access to IRQ%d (pirq %d)\n", + d->domain_id, irq, pirq); +- if ( info ) ++ if ( info && test_bit(nr, prepared) ) + cleanup_domain_irq_pirq(d, irq, info); +- info = pirq_info(d, pirq + nr); ++ info = pirq_info(d, pirq + --nr); + irq = info->arch.irq; + } + msi_desc->irq = -1; +@@ -2077,12 +2086,14 @@ int map_domain_pirq( + spin_lock_irqsave(&desc->lock, flags); + set_domain_irq_pirq(d, irq, info); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&desc->lock, flags); ++ ret = 0; + } + + done: + if ( ret ) + { +- cleanup_domain_irq_pirq(d, irq, info); ++ if ( test_bit(0, prepared) ) ++ cleanup_domain_irq_pirq(d, irq, info); + revoke: + if ( irq_deny_access(d, irq) ) + printk(XENLOG_G_ERR +--- xen/arch/x86/physdev.c.orig ++++ xen/arch/x86/physdev.c +@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ int physdev_map_pirq(domid_t domid, int + } + else if ( type == MAP_PIRQ_TYPE_MULTI_MSI ) + { +- if ( msi->entry_nr <= 0 || msi->entry_nr > 32 ) ++ if ( msi->entry_nr <= 0 || msi->entry_nr > MAX_MSI_IRQS ) + ret = -EDOM; + else if ( msi->entry_nr != 1 && !iommu_intremap ) + ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; +--- xen/include/asm-x86/msi.h.orig ++++ xen/include/asm-x86/msi.h +@@ -55,6 +55,8 @@ + /* MAX fixed pages reserved for mapping MSIX tables. */ + #define FIX_MSIX_MAX_PAGES 512 + ++#define MAX_MSI_IRQS 32 /* limited by MSI capability struct properties */ ++ + struct msi_info { + u16 seg; + u8 bus; +From: Jan Beulich +Subject: x86/FLASK: fix unmap-domain-IRQ XSM hook + +The caller and the FLASK implementation of xsm_unmap_domain_irq() +disagreed about what the "data" argument points to in the MSI case: +Change both sides to pass/take a PCI device. + +This is part of XSA-237. + +Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich +Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper + +--- xen/arch/x86/irq.c.orig ++++ xen/arch/x86/irq.c +@@ -2144,7 +2144,8 @@ int unmap_domain_pirq(struct domain *d, + nr = msi_desc->msi.nvec; + } + +- ret = xsm_unmap_domain_irq(XSM_HOOK, d, irq, msi_desc); ++ ret = xsm_unmap_domain_irq(XSM_HOOK, d, irq, ++ msi_desc ? msi_desc->dev : NULL); + if ( ret ) + goto done; + +--- xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c.orig ++++ xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c +@@ -915,8 +915,8 @@ static int flask_unmap_domain_msi (struc + u32 *sid, struct avc_audit_data *ad) + { + #ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PCI +- struct msi_info *msi = data; +- u32 machine_bdf = (msi->seg << 16) | (msi->bus << 8) | msi->devfn; ++ const struct pci_dev *pdev = data; ++ u32 machine_bdf = (pdev->seg << 16) | (pdev->bus << 8) | pdev->devfn; + + AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(ad, DEV); + ad->device = machine_bdf; Index: pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA238 diff -u /dev/null pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA238:1.1 --- /dev/null Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 2017 +++ pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA238 Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 2017 @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +$NetBSD: patch-XSA238,v 1.1 2017/10/17 08:42:30 bouyer Exp $ + +From cdc2887076b19b39fab9faec495082586f3113df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: XenProject Security Team +Date: Tue, 5 Sep 2017 13:41:37 +0200 +Subject: x86/ioreq server: correctly handle bogus + XEN_DMOP_{,un}map_io_range_to_ioreq_server arguments + +Misbehaving device model can pass incorrect XEN_DMOP_map/ +unmap_io_range_to_ioreq_server arguments, namely end < start when +specifying address range. When this happens we hit ASSERT(s <= e) in +rangeset_contains_range()/rangeset_overlaps_range() with debug builds. +Production builds will not trap right away but may misbehave later +while handling such bogus ranges. + +This is XSA-238. + +Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov +Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich +--- + xen/arch/x86/hvm/ioreq.c | 6 ++++++ + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/ioreq.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/ioreq.c +index b2a8b0e986..8c8bf1f0ec 100644 +--- xen/arch/x86/hvm/ioreq.c.orig ++++ xen/arch/x86/hvm/ioreq.c +@@ -820,6 +820,9 @@ int hvm_map_io_range_to_ioreq_server(struct domain *d, ioservid_t id, + struct hvm_ioreq_server *s; + int rc; + ++ if ( start > end ) ++ return -EINVAL; ++ + spin_lock_recursive(&d->arch.hvm_domain.ioreq_server.lock); + + rc = -ENOENT; +@@ -872,6 +875,9 @@ int hvm_unmap_io_range_from_ioreq_server(struct domain *d, ioservid_t id, + struct hvm_ioreq_server *s; + int rc; + ++ if ( start > end ) ++ return -EINVAL; ++ + spin_lock_recursive(&d->arch.hvm_domain.ioreq_server.lock); + + rc = -ENOENT; Index: pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA239 diff -u /dev/null pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA239:1.1 --- /dev/null Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 2017 +++ pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA239 Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 2017 @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +$NetBSD: patch-XSA239,v 1.1 2017/10/17 08:42:30 bouyer Exp $ + +From: Jan Beulich +Subject: x86/HVM: prefill partially used variable on emulation paths + +Certain handlers ignore the access size (vioapic_write() being the +example this was found with), perhaps leading to subsequent reads +seeing data that wasn't actually written by the guest. For +consistency and extra safety also do this on the read path of +hvm_process_io_intercept(), even if this doesn't directly affect what +guests get to see, as we've supposedly already dealt with read handlers +leaving data completely unitialized. + +This is XSA-239. + +Reported-by: Roger Pau Monné +Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné +Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich + +--- xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c.orig ++++ xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c +@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ static int hvmemul_do_io( + .count = *reps, + .dir = dir, + .df = df, +- .data = data, ++ .data = data_is_addr ? data : 0, + .data_is_ptr = data_is_addr, /* ioreq_t field name is misleading */ + .state = STATE_IOREQ_READY, + }; +--- xen/arch/x86/hvm/intercept.c.orig ++++ xen/arch/x86/hvm/intercept.c +@@ -127,6 +127,7 @@ int hvm_process_io_intercept(const struc + addr = (p->type == IOREQ_TYPE_COPY) ? + p->addr + step * i : + p->addr; ++ data = 0; + rc = ops->read(handler, addr, p->size, &data); + if ( rc != X86EMUL_OKAY ) + break; +@@ -161,6 +162,7 @@ int hvm_process_io_intercept(const struc + { + if ( p->data_is_ptr ) + { ++ data = 0; + switch ( hvm_copy_from_guest_phys(&data, p->data + step * i, + p->size) ) + { Index: pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA240 diff -u /dev/null pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA240:1.1 --- /dev/null Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 2017 +++ pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA240 Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 2017 @@ -0,0 +1,578 @@ +$NetBSD: patch-XSA240,v 1.1 2017/10/17 08:42:30 bouyer Exp $ + +From 2315b8c651e0cc31c9153d09c9912b8fbe632ad2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jan Beulich +Date: Thu, 28 Sep 2017 15:17:25 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 1/2] x86: limit linear page table use to a single level + +That's the only way that they're meant to be used. Without such a +restriction arbitrarily long chains of same-level page tables can be +built, tearing down of which may then cause arbitrarily deep recursion, +causing a stack overflow. To facilitate this restriction, a counter is +being introduced to track both the number of same-level entries in a +page table as well as the number of uses of a page table in another +same-level one (counting into positive and negative direction +respectively, utilizing the fact that both counts can't be non-zero at +the same time). + +Note that the added accounting introduces a restriction on the number +of times a page can be used in other same-level page tables - more than +32k of such uses are no longer possible. + +Note also that some put_page_and_type[_preemptible]() calls are +replaced with open-coded equivalents. This seemed preferrable to +adding "parent_table" to the matrix of functions. + +Note further that cross-domain same-level page table references are no +longer permitted (they probably never should have been). + +This is XSA-240. + +Reported-by: Jann Horn +Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich +Signed-off-by: George Dunlap +--- + xen/arch/x86/domain.c | 1 + + xen/arch/x86/mm.c | 171 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- + xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h | 2 + + xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h | 25 +++++-- + 4 files changed, 175 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c +index a725b43a67..5265b0496c 100644 +--- xen/arch/x86/domain.c.orig ++++ xen/arch/x86/domain.c +@@ -1245,6 +1245,7 @@ int arch_set_info_guest( + rc = -ERESTART; + /* Fallthrough */ + case -ERESTART: ++ v->arch.old_guest_ptpg = NULL; + v->arch.old_guest_table = + pagetable_get_page(v->arch.guest_table); + v->arch.guest_table = pagetable_null(); +diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c +index a40461d4d6..31d4a03840 100644 +--- xen/arch/x86/mm.c.orig ++++ xen/arch/x86/mm.c +@@ -733,6 +733,61 @@ static void put_data_page( + put_page(page); + } + ++static bool inc_linear_entries(struct page_info *pg) ++{ ++ typeof(pg->linear_pt_count) nc = read_atomic(&pg->linear_pt_count), oc; ++ ++ do { ++ /* ++ * The check below checks for the "linear use" count being non-zero ++ * as well as overflow. Signed integer overflow is undefined behavior ++ * according to the C spec. However, as long as linear_pt_count is ++ * smaller in size than 'int', the arithmetic operation of the ++ * increment below won't overflow; rather the result will be truncated ++ * when stored. Ensure that this is always true. ++ */ ++ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(nc) >= sizeof(int)); ++ oc = nc++; ++ if ( nc <= 0 ) ++ return false; ++ nc = cmpxchg(&pg->linear_pt_count, oc, nc); ++ } while ( oc != nc ); ++ ++ return true; ++} ++ ++static void dec_linear_entries(struct page_info *pg) ++{ ++ typeof(pg->linear_pt_count) oc; ++ ++ oc = arch_fetch_and_add(&pg->linear_pt_count, -1); ++ ASSERT(oc > 0); ++} ++ ++static bool inc_linear_uses(struct page_info *pg) ++{ ++ typeof(pg->linear_pt_count) nc = read_atomic(&pg->linear_pt_count), oc; ++ ++ do { ++ /* See the respective comment in inc_linear_entries(). */ ++ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(nc) >= sizeof(int)); ++ oc = nc--; ++ if ( nc >= 0 ) ++ return false; ++ nc = cmpxchg(&pg->linear_pt_count, oc, nc); ++ } while ( oc != nc ); ++ ++ return true; ++} ++ ++static void dec_linear_uses(struct page_info *pg) ++{ ++ typeof(pg->linear_pt_count) oc; ++ ++ oc = arch_fetch_and_add(&pg->linear_pt_count, 1); ++ ASSERT(oc < 0); ++} ++ + /* + * We allow root tables to map each other (a.k.a. linear page tables). It + * needs some special care with reference counts and access permissions: +@@ -762,15 +817,35 @@ get_##level##_linear_pagetable( \ + \ + if ( (pfn = level##e_get_pfn(pde)) != pde_pfn ) \ + { \ ++ struct page_info *ptpg = mfn_to_page(pde_pfn); \ ++ \ ++ /* Make sure the page table belongs to the correct domain. */ \ ++ if ( unlikely(page_get_owner(ptpg) != d) ) \ ++ return 0; \ ++ \ + /* Make sure the mapped frame belongs to the correct domain. */ \ + if ( unlikely(!get_page_from_pagenr(pfn, d)) ) \ + return 0; \ + \ + /* \ +- * Ensure that the mapped frame is an already-validated page table. \ ++ * Ensure that the mapped frame is an already-validated page table \ ++ * and is not itself having linear entries, as well as that the \ ++ * containing page table is not iself in use as a linear page table \ ++ * elsewhere. \ + * If so, atomically increment the count (checking for overflow). \ + */ \ + page = mfn_to_page(pfn); \ ++ if ( !inc_linear_entries(ptpg) ) \ ++ { \ ++ put_page(page); \ ++ return 0; \ ++ } \ ++ if ( !inc_linear_uses(page) ) \ ++ { \ ++ dec_linear_entries(ptpg); \ ++ put_page(page); \ ++ return 0; \ ++ } \ + y = page->u.inuse.type_info; \ + do { \ + x = y; \ +@@ -778,6 +853,8 @@ get_##level##_linear_pagetable( \ + unlikely((x & (PGT_type_mask|PGT_validated)) != \ + (PGT_##level##_page_table|PGT_validated)) ) \ + { \ ++ dec_linear_uses(page); \ ++ dec_linear_entries(ptpg); \ + put_page(page); \ + return 0; \ + } \ +@@ -1202,6 +1279,9 @@ get_page_from_l4e( + l3e_remove_flags((pl3e), _PAGE_USER|_PAGE_RW|_PAGE_ACCESSED); \ + } while ( 0 ) + ++static int _put_page_type(struct page_info *page, bool preemptible, ++ struct page_info *ptpg); ++ + void put_page_from_l1e(l1_pgentry_t l1e, struct domain *l1e_owner) + { + unsigned long pfn = l1e_get_pfn(l1e); +@@ -1271,17 +1351,22 @@ static int put_page_from_l2e(l2_pgentry_t l2e, unsigned long pfn) + if ( l2e_get_flags(l2e) & _PAGE_PSE ) + put_superpage(l2e_get_pfn(l2e)); + else +- put_page_and_type(l2e_get_page(l2e)); ++ { ++ struct page_info *pg = l2e_get_page(l2e); ++ int rc = _put_page_type(pg, false, mfn_to_page(pfn)); ++ ++ ASSERT(!rc); ++ put_page(pg); ++ } + + return 0; + } + +-static int __put_page_type(struct page_info *, int preemptible); +- + static int put_page_from_l3e(l3_pgentry_t l3e, unsigned long pfn, + int partial, bool_t defer) + { + struct page_info *pg; ++ int rc; + + if ( !(l3e_get_flags(l3e) & _PAGE_PRESENT) || (l3e_get_pfn(l3e) == pfn) ) + return 1; +@@ -1304,21 +1389,28 @@ static int put_page_from_l3e(l3_pgentry_t l3e, unsigned long pfn, + if ( unlikely(partial > 0) ) + { + ASSERT(!defer); +- return __put_page_type(pg, 1); ++ return _put_page_type(pg, true, mfn_to_page(pfn)); + } + + if ( defer ) + { ++ current->arch.old_guest_ptpg = mfn_to_page(pfn); + current->arch.old_guest_table = pg; + return 0; + } + +- return put_page_and_type_preemptible(pg); ++ rc = _put_page_type(pg, true, mfn_to_page(pfn)); ++ if ( likely(!rc) ) ++ put_page(pg); ++ ++ return rc; + } + + static int put_page_from_l4e(l4_pgentry_t l4e, unsigned long pfn, + int partial, bool_t defer) + { ++ int rc = 1; ++ + if ( (l4e_get_flags(l4e) & _PAGE_PRESENT) && + (l4e_get_pfn(l4e) != pfn) ) + { +@@ -1327,18 +1419,22 @@ static int put_page_from_l4e(l4_pgentry_t l4e, unsigned long pfn, + if ( unlikely(partial > 0) ) + { + ASSERT(!defer); +- return __put_page_type(pg, 1); ++ return _put_page_type(pg, true, mfn_to_page(pfn)); + } + + if ( defer ) + { ++ current->arch.old_guest_ptpg = mfn_to_page(pfn); + current->arch.old_guest_table = pg; + return 0; + } + +- return put_page_and_type_preemptible(pg); ++ rc = _put_page_type(pg, true, mfn_to_page(pfn)); ++ if ( likely(!rc) ) ++ put_page(pg); + } +- return 1; ++ ++ return rc; + } + + static int alloc_l1_table(struct page_info *page) +@@ -1536,6 +1632,7 @@ static int alloc_l3_table(struct page_info *page) + { + page->nr_validated_ptes = i; + page->partial_pte = 0; ++ current->arch.old_guest_ptpg = NULL; + current->arch.old_guest_table = page; + } + while ( i-- > 0 ) +@@ -1628,6 +1725,7 @@ static int alloc_l4_table(struct page_info *page) + { + if ( current->arch.old_guest_table ) + page->nr_validated_ptes++; ++ current->arch.old_guest_ptpg = NULL; + current->arch.old_guest_table = page; + } + } +@@ -2370,14 +2468,20 @@ int free_page_type(struct page_info *pag + } + + +-static int __put_final_page_type( +- struct page_info *page, unsigned long type, int preemptible) ++static int _put_final_page_type(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type, ++ bool preemptible, struct page_info *ptpg) + { + int rc = free_page_type(page, type, preemptible); + + /* No need for atomic update of type_info here: noone else updates it. */ + if ( rc == 0 ) + { ++ if ( ptpg && PGT_type_equal(type, ptpg->u.inuse.type_info) ) ++ { ++ dec_linear_uses(page); ++ dec_linear_entries(ptpg); ++ } ++ ASSERT(!page->linear_pt_count || page_get_owner(page)->is_dying); + /* + * Record TLB information for flush later. We do not stamp page tables + * when running in shadow mode: +@@ -2413,8 +2517,8 @@ static int __put_final_page_type( + } + + +-static int __put_page_type(struct page_info *page, +- int preemptible) ++static int _put_page_type(struct page_info *page, bool preemptible, ++ struct page_info *ptpg) + { + unsigned long nx, x, y = page->u.inuse.type_info; + int rc = 0; +@@ -2441,12 +2545,28 @@ static int __put_page_type(struct page_info *page, + x, nx)) != x) ) + continue; + /* We cleared the 'valid bit' so we do the clean up. */ +- rc = __put_final_page_type(page, x, preemptible); ++ rc = _put_final_page_type(page, x, preemptible, ptpg); ++ ptpg = NULL; + if ( x & PGT_partial ) + put_page(page); + break; + } + ++ if ( ptpg && PGT_type_equal(x, ptpg->u.inuse.type_info) ) ++ { ++ /* ++ * page_set_tlbflush_timestamp() accesses the same union ++ * linear_pt_count lives in. Unvalidated page table pages, ++ * however, should occur during domain destruction only ++ * anyway. Updating of linear_pt_count luckily is not ++ * necessary anymore for a dying domain. ++ */ ++ ASSERT(page_get_owner(page)->is_dying); ++ ASSERT(page->linear_pt_count < 0); ++ ASSERT(ptpg->linear_pt_count > 0); ++ ptpg = NULL; ++ } ++ + /* + * Record TLB information for flush later. We do not stamp page + * tables when running in shadow mode: +@@ -2466,6 +2586,13 @@ static int __put_page_type(struct page_info *page, + return -EINTR; + } + ++ if ( ptpg && PGT_type_equal(x, ptpg->u.inuse.type_info) ) ++ { ++ ASSERT(!rc); ++ dec_linear_uses(page); ++ dec_linear_entries(ptpg); ++ } ++ + return rc; + } + +@@ -2600,6 +2727,7 @@ static int __get_page_type(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type, + page->nr_validated_ptes = 0; + page->partial_pte = 0; + } ++ page->linear_pt_count = 0; + rc = alloc_page_type(page, type, preemptible); + } + +@@ -2614,7 +2742,7 @@ static int __get_page_type(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type, + + void put_page_type(struct page_info *page) + { +- int rc = __put_page_type(page, 0); ++ int rc = _put_page_type(page, false, NULL); + ASSERT(rc == 0); + (void)rc; + } +@@ -2630,7 +2758,7 @@ int get_page_type(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type) + + int put_page_type_preemptible(struct page_info *page) + { +- return __put_page_type(page, 1); ++ return _put_page_type(page, true, NULL); + } + + int get_page_type_preemptible(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type) +@@ -2836,11 +2964,14 @@ int put_old_guest_table(struct vcpu *v) + if ( !v->arch.old_guest_table ) + return 0; + +- switch ( rc = put_page_and_type_preemptible(v->arch.old_guest_table) ) ++ switch ( rc = _put_page_type(v->arch.old_guest_table, true, ++ v->arch.old_guest_ptpg) ) + { + case -EINTR: + case -ERESTART: + return -ERESTART; ++ case 0: ++ put_page(v->arch.old_guest_table); + } + + v->arch.old_guest_table = NULL; +@@ -2997,6 +3128,7 @@ int new_guest_cr3(unsigned long mfn) + rc = -ERESTART; + /* fallthrough */ + case -ERESTART: ++ curr->arch.old_guest_ptpg = NULL; + curr->arch.old_guest_table = page; + break; + default: +@@ -3264,7 +3396,10 @@ long do_mmuext_op( + if ( type == PGT_l1_page_table ) + put_page_and_type(page); + else ++ { ++ curr->arch.old_guest_ptpg = NULL; + curr->arch.old_guest_table = page; ++ } + } + } + +@@ -3297,6 +3432,7 @@ long do_mmuext_op( + { + case -EINTR: + case -ERESTART: ++ curr->arch.old_guest_ptpg = NULL; + curr->arch.old_guest_table = page; + rc = 0; + break; +@@ -3375,6 +3511,7 @@ long do_mmuext_op( + rc = -ERESTART; + /* fallthrough */ + case -ERESTART: ++ curr->arch.old_guest_ptpg = NULL; + curr->arch.old_guest_table = page; + break; + default: +diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h +index f6a40eb881..60bb8c9014 100644 +--- xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h.orig ++++ xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h +@@ -531,6 +531,8 @@ struct arch_vcpu + pagetable_t guest_table_user; /* (MFN) x86/64 user-space pagetable */ + pagetable_t guest_table; /* (MFN) guest notion of cr3 */ + struct page_info *old_guest_table; /* partially destructed pagetable */ ++ struct page_info *old_guest_ptpg; /* containing page table of the */ ++ /* former, if any */ + /* guest_table holds a ref to the page, and also a type-count unless + * shadow refcounts are in use */ + pagetable_t shadow_table[4]; /* (MFN) shadow(s) of guest */ +diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h +index 6687dbc985..63590a7716 100644 +--- xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h.orig ++++ xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h +@@ -125,11 +125,11 @@ struct page_info + u32 tlbflush_timestamp; + + /* +- * When PGT_partial is true then this field is valid and indicates +- * that PTEs in the range [0, @nr_validated_ptes) have been validated. +- * An extra page reference must be acquired (or not dropped) whenever +- * PGT_partial gets set, and it must be dropped when the flag gets +- * cleared. This is so that a get() leaving a page in partially ++ * When PGT_partial is true then the first two fields are valid and ++ * indicate that PTEs in the range [0, @nr_validated_ptes) have been ++ * validated. An extra page reference must be acquired (or not dropped) ++ * whenever PGT_partial gets set, and it must be dropped when the flag ++ * gets cleared. This is so that a get() leaving a page in partially + * validated state (where the caller would drop the reference acquired + * due to the getting of the type [apparently] failing [-ERESTART]) + * would not accidentally result in a page left with zero general +@@ -153,10 +153,18 @@ struct page_info + * put_page_from_lNe() (due to the apparent failure), and hence it + * must be dropped when the put operation is resumed (and completes), + * but it must not be acquired if picking up the page for validation. ++ * ++ * The 3rd field, @linear_pt_count, indicates ++ * - by a positive value, how many same-level page table entries a page ++ * table has, ++ * - by a negative value, in how many same-level page tables a page is ++ * in use. + */ + struct { +- u16 nr_validated_ptes; +- s8 partial_pte; ++ u16 nr_validated_ptes:PAGETABLE_ORDER + 1; ++ u16 :16 - PAGETABLE_ORDER - 1 - 2; ++ s16 partial_pte:2; ++ s16 linear_pt_count; + }; + + /* +@@ -207,6 +215,9 @@ struct page_info + #define PGT_count_width PG_shift(9) + #define PGT_count_mask ((1UL< +Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 11:46:55 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 2/2] x86/mm: Disable PV linear pagetables by default + +Allowing pagetables to point to other pagetables of the same level +(often called 'linear pagetables') has been included in Xen since its +inception. But it is not used by the most common PV guests (Linux, +NetBSD, minios), and has been the source of a number of subtle +reference-counting bugs. + +Add a command-line option to control whether PV linear pagetables are +allowed (disabled by default). + +Reported-by: Jann Horn +Signed-off-by: George Dunlap +Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper +--- +Changes since v2: +- s/_/-/; in command-line option +- Added __read_mostly +--- + docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown | 15 +++++++++++++++ + xen/arch/x86/mm.c | 9 +++++++++ + 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown +index 54acc60723..ffa66eb146 100644 +--- docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown.orig ++++ docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown +@@ -1350,6 +1350,21 @@ The following resources are available: + CDP, one COS will corespond two CBMs other than one with CAT, due to the + sum of CBMs is fixed, that means actual `cos_max` in use will automatically + reduce to half when CDP is enabled. ++ ++### pv-linear-pt ++> `= ` ++ ++> Default: `true` ++ ++Allow PV guests to have pagetable entries pointing to other pagetables ++of the same level (i.e., allowing L2 PTEs to point to other L2 pages). ++This technique is often called "linear pagetables", and is sometimes ++used to allow operating systems a simple way to consistently map the ++current process's pagetables into its own virtual address space. ++ ++None of the most common PV operating systems (Linux, MiniOS) ++use this technique, but NetBSD in PV mode, and maybe custom operating ++systems which do. + + ### reboot + > `= t[riple] | k[bd] | a[cpi] | p[ci] | P[ower] | e[fi] | n[o] [, [w]arm | [c]old]` +diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c +index 31d4a03840..5d125cff3a 100644 +--- xen/arch/x86/mm.c.orig ++++ xen/arch/x86/mm.c +@@ -800,6 +800,9 @@ static void dec_linear_uses(struct page_info *pg) + * frame if it is mapped by a different root table. This is sufficient and + * also necessary to allow validation of a root table mapping itself. + */ ++static bool __read_mostly pv_linear_pt_enable = true; ++boolean_param("pv-linear-pt", pv_linear_pt_enable); ++ + #define define_get_linear_pagetable(level) \ + static int \ + get_##level##_linear_pagetable( \ +@@ -809,6 +812,12 @@ get_##level##_linear_pagetable( \ + struct page_info *page; \ + unsigned long pfn; \ + \ ++ if ( !pv_linear_pt_enable ) \ ++ { \ ++ MEM_LOG("Attempt to create linear p.t. (feature disabled)"); \ ++ return 0; \ ++ } \ ++ \ + if ( (level##e_get_flags(pde) & _PAGE_RW) ) \ + { \ + MEM_LOG("Attempt to create linear p.t. with write perms"); \ +-- +2.14.1 + Index: pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA241 diff -u /dev/null pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA241:1.1 --- /dev/null Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 2017 +++ pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA241 Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 2017 @@ -0,0 +1,122 @@ +$NetBSD: patch-XSA241,v 1.1 2017/10/17 08:42:30 bouyer Exp $ + +x86: don't store possibly stale TLB flush time stamp + +While the timing window is extremely narrow, it is theoretically +possible for an update to the TLB flush clock and a subsequent flush +IPI to happen between the read and write parts of the update of the +per-page stamp. Exclude this possibility by disabling interrupts +across the update, preventing the IPI to be serviced in the middle. + +This is XSA-241. + +Reported-by: Jann Horn +Suggested-by: George Dunlap +Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich +Reviewed-by: George Dunlap + +--- xen/arch/arm/smp.c.orig ++++ xen/arch/arm/smp.c +@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@ + #include ++#include + #include + #include + #include +--- xen/arch/x86/mm.c.orig ++++ xen/arch/x86/mm.c +@@ -2524,7 +2524,7 @@ static int _put_final_page_type(struct p + */ + if ( !(shadow_mode_enabled(page_get_owner(page)) && + (page->count_info & PGC_page_table)) ) +- page->tlbflush_timestamp = tlbflush_current_time(); ++ page_set_tlbflush_timestamp(page); + wmb(); + page->u.inuse.type_info--; + } +@@ -2534,7 +2534,7 @@ static int _put_final_page_type(struct p + (PGT_count_mask|PGT_validated|PGT_partial)) == 1); + if ( !(shadow_mode_enabled(page_get_owner(page)) && + (page->count_info & PGC_page_table)) ) +- page->tlbflush_timestamp = tlbflush_current_time(); ++ page_set_tlbflush_timestamp(page); + wmb(); + page->u.inuse.type_info |= PGT_validated; + } +@@ -2588,7 +2588,7 @@ static int _put_page_type(struct page_in + if ( ptpg && PGT_type_equal(x, ptpg->u.inuse.type_info) ) + { + /* +- * page_set_tlbflush_timestamp() accesses the same union ++ * set_tlbflush_timestamp() accesses the same union + * linear_pt_count lives in. Unvalidated page table pages, + * however, should occur during domain destruction only + * anyway. Updating of linear_pt_count luckily is not +@@ -2609,7 +2609,7 @@ static int _put_page_type(struct page_in + */ + if ( !(shadow_mode_enabled(page_get_owner(page)) && + (page->count_info & PGC_page_table)) ) +- page->tlbflush_timestamp = tlbflush_current_time(); ++ page_set_tlbflush_timestamp(page); + } + + if ( likely((y = cmpxchg(&page->u.inuse.type_info, x, nx)) == x) ) +--- xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c.orig ++++ xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c +@@ -1464,7 +1464,7 @@ void shadow_free(struct domain *d, mfn_t + * TLBs when we reuse the page. Because the destructors leave the + * contents of the pages in place, we can delay TLB flushes until + * just before the allocator hands the page out again. */ +- sp->tlbflush_timestamp = tlbflush_current_time(); ++ page_set_tlbflush_timestamp(sp); + perfc_decr(shadow_alloc_count); + page_list_add_tail(sp, &d->arch.paging.shadow.freelist); + sp = next; +--- xen/common/page_alloc.c.orig ++++ xen/common/page_alloc.c +@@ -960,7 +960,7 @@ static void free_heap_pages( + /* If a page has no owner it will need no safety TLB flush. */ + pg[i].u.free.need_tlbflush = (page_get_owner(&pg[i]) != NULL); + if ( pg[i].u.free.need_tlbflush ) +- pg[i].tlbflush_timestamp = tlbflush_current_time(); ++ page_set_tlbflush_timestamp(&pg[i]); + + /* This page is not a guest frame any more. */ + page_set_owner(&pg[i], NULL); /* set_gpfn_from_mfn snoops pg owner */ +--- xen/include/asm-arm/flushtlb.h.orig ++++ xen/include/asm-arm/flushtlb.h +@@ -12,6 +12,11 @@ static inline void tlbflush_filter(cpuma + + #define tlbflush_current_time() (0) + ++static inline void page_set_tlbflush_timestamp(struct page_info *page) ++{ ++ page->tlbflush_timestamp = tlbflush_current_time(); ++} ++ + #if defined(CONFIG_ARM_32) + # include + #elif defined(CONFIG_ARM_64) +--- xen/include/asm-x86/flushtlb.h.orig ++++ xen/include/asm-x86/flushtlb.h +@@ -23,6 +23,20 @@ DECLARE_PER_CPU(u32, tlbflush_time); + + #define tlbflush_current_time() tlbflush_clock + ++static inline void page_set_tlbflush_timestamp(struct page_info *page) ++{ ++ /* ++ * Prevent storing a stale time stamp, which could happen if an update ++ * to tlbflush_clock plus a subsequent flush IPI happen between the ++ * reading of tlbflush_clock and the writing of the struct page_info ++ * field. ++ */ ++ ASSERT(local_irq_is_enabled()); ++ local_irq_disable(); ++ page->tlbflush_timestamp = tlbflush_current_time(); ++ local_irq_enable(); ++} ++ + /* + * @cpu_stamp is the timestamp at last TLB flush for the CPU we are testing. + * @lastuse_stamp is a timestamp taken when the PFN we are testing was last Index: pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA242 diff -u /dev/null pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA242:1.1 --- /dev/null Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 2017 +++ pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA242 Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 2017 @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +$NetBSD: patch-XSA242,v 1.1 2017/10/17 08:42:30 bouyer Exp $ + +From: Jan Beulich +Subject: x86: don't allow page_unlock() to drop the last type reference + +Only _put_page_type() does the necessary cleanup, and hence not all +domain pages can be released during guest cleanup (leaving around +zombie domains) if we get this wrong. + +This is XSA-242. + +Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich + +--- xen/arch/x86/mm.c.orig ++++ xen/arch/x86/mm.c +@@ -1923,7 +1923,11 @@ void page_unlock(struct page_info *page) + + do { + x = y; ++ ASSERT((x & PGT_count_mask) && (x & PGT_locked)); ++ + nx = x - (1 | PGT_locked); ++ /* We must not drop the last reference here. */ ++ ASSERT(nx & PGT_count_mask); + } while ( (y = cmpxchg(&page->u.inuse.type_info, x, nx)) != x ); + } + +@@ -2611,6 +2615,17 @@ static int _put_page_type(struct page_in + (page->count_info & PGC_page_table)) ) + page_set_tlbflush_timestamp(page); + } ++ else if ( unlikely((nx & (PGT_locked | PGT_count_mask)) == ++ (PGT_locked | 1)) ) ++ { ++ /* ++ * We must not drop the second to last reference when the page is ++ * locked, as page_unlock() doesn't do any cleanup of the type. ++ */ ++ cpu_relax(); ++ y = page->u.inuse.type_info; ++ continue; ++ } + + if ( likely((y = cmpxchg(&page->u.inuse.type_info, x, nx)) == x) ) + break; Index: pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA243 diff -u /dev/null pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA243:1.1 --- /dev/null Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 2017 +++ pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA243 Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 2017 @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +$NetBSD: patch-XSA243,v 1.1 2017/10/17 08:42:30 bouyer Exp $ + +From: Andrew Cooper +Subject: x86/shadow: Don't create self-linear shadow mappings for 4-level translated guests + +When initially creating a monitor table for 4-level translated guests, don't +install a shadow-linear mapping. This mapping is actually self-linear, and +trips up the writeable heuristic logic into following Xen's mappings, not the +guests' shadows it was expecting to follow. + +A consequence of this is that sh_guess_wrmap() needs to cope with there being +no shadow-linear mapping present, which in practice occurs once each time a +vcpu switches to 4-level paging from a different paging mode. + +An appropriate shadow-linear slot will be inserted into the monitor table +either while constructing lower level monitor tables, or by sh_update_cr3(). + +While fixing this, clarify the safety of the other mappings. Despite +appearing unsafe, it is correct to create a guest-linear mapping for +translated domains; this is self-linear and doesn't point into the translated +domain. Drop a dead clause for translate != external guests. + +This is XSA-243. + +Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper +Acked-by: Tim Deegan + +diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c +index d70b1c6..029e8d4 100644 +--- xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c.orig ++++ xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c +@@ -1472,26 +1472,38 @@ void sh_install_xen_entries_in_l4(struct domain *d, mfn_t gl4mfn, mfn_t sl4mfn) + sl4e[shadow_l4_table_offset(RO_MPT_VIRT_START)] = shadow_l4e_empty(); + } + +- /* Shadow linear mapping for 4-level shadows. N.B. for 3-level +- * shadows on 64-bit xen, this linear mapping is later replaced by the +- * monitor pagetable structure, which is built in make_monitor_table +- * and maintained by sh_update_linear_entries. */ +- sl4e[shadow_l4_table_offset(SH_LINEAR_PT_VIRT_START)] = +- shadow_l4e_from_mfn(sl4mfn, __PAGE_HYPERVISOR); +- +- /* Self linear mapping. */ +- if ( shadow_mode_translate(d) && !shadow_mode_external(d) ) ++ /* ++ * Linear mapping slots: ++ * ++ * Calling this function with gl4mfn == sl4mfn is used to construct a ++ * monitor table for translated domains. In this case, gl4mfn forms the ++ * self-linear mapping (i.e. not pointing into the translated domain), and ++ * the shadow-linear slot is skipped. The shadow-linear slot is either ++ * filled when constructing lower level monitor tables, or via ++ * sh_update_cr3() for 4-level guests. ++ * ++ * Calling this function with gl4mfn != sl4mfn is used for non-translated ++ * guests, where the shadow-linear slot is actually self-linear, and the ++ * guest-linear slot points into the guests view of its pagetables. ++ */ ++ if ( shadow_mode_translate(d) ) + { +- // linear tables may not be used with translated PV guests +- sl4e[shadow_l4_table_offset(LINEAR_PT_VIRT_START)] = ++ ASSERT(mfn_eq(gl4mfn, sl4mfn)); ++ ++ sl4e[shadow_l4_table_offset(SH_LINEAR_PT_VIRT_START)] = + shadow_l4e_empty(); + } + else + { +- sl4e[shadow_l4_table_offset(LINEAR_PT_VIRT_START)] = +- shadow_l4e_from_mfn(gl4mfn, __PAGE_HYPERVISOR); ++ ASSERT(!mfn_eq(gl4mfn, sl4mfn)); ++ ++ sl4e[shadow_l4_table_offset(SH_LINEAR_PT_VIRT_START)] = ++ shadow_l4e_from_mfn(sl4mfn, __PAGE_HYPERVISOR); + } + ++ sl4e[shadow_l4_table_offset(LINEAR_PT_VIRT_START)] = ++ shadow_l4e_from_mfn(gl4mfn, __PAGE_HYPERVISOR); ++ + unmap_domain_page(sl4e); + } + #endif +@@ -4287,6 +4299,11 @@ static int sh_guess_wrmap(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long vaddr, mfn_t gmfn) + + /* Carefully look in the shadow linear map for the l1e we expect */ + #if SHADOW_PAGING_LEVELS >= 4 ++ /* Is a shadow linear map is installed in the first place? */ ++ sl4p = v->arch.paging.shadow.guest_vtable; ++ sl4p += shadow_l4_table_offset(SH_LINEAR_PT_VIRT_START); ++ if ( !(shadow_l4e_get_flags(*sl4p) & _PAGE_PRESENT) ) ++ return 0; + sl4p = sh_linear_l4_table(v) + shadow_l4_linear_offset(vaddr); + if ( !(shadow_l4e_get_flags(*sl4p) & _PAGE_PRESENT) ) + return 0; Index: pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA244 diff -u /dev/null pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA244:1.1 --- /dev/null Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 2017 +++ pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA244 Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 2017 @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +$NetBSD: patch-XSA244,v 1.1 2017/10/17 08:42:30 bouyer Exp $ + +From: Andrew Cooper +Subject: [PATCH] x86/cpu: Fix IST handling during PCPU bringup + +Clear IST references in newly allocated IDTs. Nothing good will come of +having them set before the TSS is suitably constructed (although the chances +of the CPU surviving such an IST interrupt/exception is extremely slim). + +Uniformly set the IST references after the TSS is in place. This fixes an +issue on AMD hardware, where onlining a PCPU while PCPU0 is in HVM context +will cause IST_NONE to be copied into the new IDT, making that PCPU vulnerable +to privilege escalation from PV guests until it subsequently schedules an HVM +guest. + +This is XSA-244 + +Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper +Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich +--- + xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c | 5 +++++ + xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c | 3 +++ + 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c +index 78f5667..6cf3628 100644 +--- xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c.orig ++++ xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c +@@ -640,6 +640,7 @@ void __init early_cpu_init(void) + * - Sets up TSS with stack pointers, including ISTs + * - Inserts TSS selector into regular and compat GDTs + * - Loads GDT, IDT, TR then null LDT ++ * - Sets up IST references in the IDT + */ + void load_system_tables(void) + { +@@ -702,6 +703,10 @@ void load_system_tables(void) + asm volatile ("ltr %w0" : : "rm" (TSS_ENTRY << 3) ); + asm volatile ("lldt %w0" : : "rm" (0) ); + ++ set_ist(&idt_tables[cpu][TRAP_double_fault], IST_DF); ++ set_ist(&idt_tables[cpu][TRAP_nmi], IST_NMI); ++ set_ist(&idt_tables[cpu][TRAP_machine_check], IST_MCE); ++ + /* + * Bottom-of-stack must be 16-byte aligned! + * +diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c b/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c +index 3ca716c..1609b62 100644 +--- xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c.orig ++++ xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c +@@ -724,6 +724,9 @@ static int cpu_smpboot_alloc(unsigned int cpu) + if ( idt_tables[cpu] == NULL ) + goto oom; + memcpy(idt_tables[cpu], idt_table, IDT_ENTRIES * sizeof(idt_entry_t)); ++ set_ist(&idt_tables[cpu][TRAP_double_fault], IST_NONE); ++ set_ist(&idt_tables[cpu][TRAP_nmi], IST_NONE); ++ set_ist(&idt_tables[cpu][TRAP_machine_check], IST_NONE); + + for ( stub_page = 0, i = cpu & ~(STUBS_PER_PAGE - 1); + i < nr_cpu_ids && i <= (cpu | (STUBS_PER_PAGE - 1)); ++i ) Index: pkgsrc/sysutils/xentools48/patches/patch-XSA233 diff -u /dev/null pkgsrc/sysutils/xentools48/patches/patch-XSA233:1.1 --- /dev/null Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 2017 +++ pkgsrc/sysutils/xentools48/patches/patch-XSA233 Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 2017 @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +$NetBSD: patch-XSA233,v 1.1 2017/10/17 08:42:30 bouyer Exp $ + +From: Juergen Gross +Subject: tools/xenstore: dont unlink connection object twice + +A connection object of a domain with associated stubdom has two +parents: the domain and the stubdom. When cleaning up the list of +active domains in domain_cleanup() make sure not to unlink the +connection twice from the same domain. This could happen when the +domain and its stubdom are being destroyed at the same time leading +to the domain loop being entered twice. + +Additionally don't use talloc_free() in this case as it will remove +a random parent link, leading eventually to a memory leak. Use +talloc_unlink() instead specifying the context from which the +connection object should be removed. + +This is XSA-233. + +Reported-by: Eric Chanudet +Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross +Reviewed-by: Ian Jackson + +--- tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c.orig ++++ tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c +@@ -221,10 +221,11 @@ static int destroy_domain(void *_domain) + static void domain_cleanup(void) + { + xc_dominfo_t dominfo; +- struct domain *domain, *tmp; ++ struct domain *domain; + int notify = 0; + +- list_for_each_entry_safe(domain, tmp, &domains, list) { ++ again: ++ list_for_each_entry(domain, &domains, list) { + if (xc_domain_getinfo(*xc_handle, domain->domid, 1, + &dominfo) == 1 && + dominfo.domid == domain->domid) { +@@ -236,8 +237,12 @@ static void domain_cleanup(void) + if (!dominfo.dying) + continue; + } +- talloc_free(domain->conn); +- notify = 0; /* destroy_domain() fires the watch */ ++ if (domain->conn) { ++ talloc_unlink(talloc_autofree_context(), domain->conn); ++ domain->conn = NULL; ++ notify = 0; /* destroy_domain() fires the watch */ ++ goto again; ++ } + } + + if (notify) Index: pkgsrc/sysutils/xentools48/patches/patch-XSA240 diff -u /dev/null pkgsrc/sysutils/xentools48/patches/patch-XSA240:1.1 --- /dev/null Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 2017 +++ pkgsrc/sysutils/xentools48/patches/patch-XSA240 Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 2017 @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +$NetBSD: patch-XSA240,v 1.1 2017/10/17 08:42:30 bouyer Exp $ + +From 41d579aad2fee971e5ce0279a9b559a0fdc74452 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: George Dunlap +Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 11:46:55 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 2/2] x86/mm: Disable PV linear pagetables by default + +Allowing pagetables to point to other pagetables of the same level +(often called 'linear pagetables') has been included in Xen since its +inception. But it is not used by the most common PV guests (Linux, +NetBSD, minios), and has been the source of a number of subtle +reference-counting bugs. + +Add a command-line option to control whether PV linear pagetables are +allowed (disabled by default). + +Reported-by: Jann Horn +Signed-off-by: George Dunlap +Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper +--- +Changes since v2: +- s/_/-/; in command-line option +- Added __read_mostly +--- + docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown | 15 +++++++++++++++ + xen/arch/x86/mm.c | 9 +++++++++ + 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown +index 54acc60723..ffa66eb146 100644 +--- docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown.orig ++++ docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown +@@ -1350,6 +1350,21 @@ The following resources are available: + CDP, one COS will corespond two CBMs other than one with CAT, due to the + sum of CBMs is fixed, that means actual `cos_max` in use will automatically + reduce to half when CDP is enabled. ++ ++### pv-linear-pt ++> `= ` ++ ++> Default: `true` ++ ++Allow PV guests to have pagetable entries pointing to other pagetables ++of the same level (i.e., allowing L2 PTEs to point to other L2 pages). ++This technique is often called "linear pagetables", and is sometimes ++used to allow operating systems a simple way to consistently map the ++current process's pagetables into its own virtual address space. ++ ++None of the most common PV operating systems (Linux, MiniOS) ++use this technique, but NetBSD in PV mode, and maybe custom operating ++systems which do. + + ### reboot + > `= t[riple] | k[bd] | a[cpi] | p[ci] | P[ower] | e[fi] | n[o] [, [w]arm | [c]old]` +diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c +index 31d4a03840..5d125cff3a 100644 --_----------=_1508229750117390--