Apply upstream patch to fix data corruption.

Bump PKGREVISION.


(jperkin)

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.174 2013/02/06 23:20:57 jperkin Exp $
+# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.175 2013/02/08 14:11:08 jperkin Exp $
 
 DISTNAME=	openssl-1.0.1d
 MASTER_SITES=	http://ftp.openssl.org/source/
-PKGREVISION=	1
+PKGREVISION=	2
 SVR4_PKGNAME=	ossl
 CATEGORIES=	security
 

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.92 2013/02/06 21:40:33 jperkin Exp $
+$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.93 2013/02/08 14:11:08 jperkin Exp $
 
 SHA1 (openssl-1.0.1d.tar.gz) = 5e586810ea516a5eec1c7d7c730a17fb528de32d
 RMD160 (openssl-1.0.1d.tar.gz) = 37710d9841a9d89e55d01a09083801ee0cc63f76
@@ -11,3 +11,4 @@
 SHA1 (patch-ag) = b407200455878a8a151fc9b4f771fe17552d04fc
 SHA1 (patch-ak) = 049250b9bd42e6f155145703135dab39a7ec17e0
 SHA1 (patch-engines_ccgost_Makefile) = 08999f0f40969883482ad9ffc1aa9959ed7d402c
+SHA1 (patch-ssl_s3__cbc.c) = e6b3e1f79b6cab8f8097a277302b078e12fcaf24

$NetBSD: patch-ssl_s3__cbc.c,v 1.1 2013/02/08 14:11:08 jperkin Exp $

Apply data-corruption patch from:

  http://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff;h=32cc247

Fix IV check and padding removal.

Fix the calculation that checks there is enough room in a record
after removing padding and optional explicit IV. (by Steve)

For AEAD remove the correct number of padding bytes (by Andy)

--- ssl/s3_cbc.c
+++ ssl/s3_cbc.c
@@ -139,31 +139,22 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s,
 			    unsigned mac_size)
 	{
 	unsigned padding_length, good, to_check, i;
-	const char has_explicit_iv =
-		s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_VERSION;
-	const unsigned overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ +
-				  mac_size +
-				  (has_explicit_iv ? block_size : 0);
-
-	/* These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant
-	 * time. */
-	if (overhead > rec->length)
-		return 0;
-
-	/* We can always safely skip the explicit IV. We check at the beginning
-	 * of this function that the record has at least enough space for the
-	 * IV, MAC and padding length byte. (These can be checked in
-	 * non-constant time because it's all public information.) So, if the
-	 * padding was invalid, then we didn't change |rec->length| and this is
-	 * safe. If the padding was valid then we know that we have at least
-	 * overhead+padding_length bytes of space and so this is still safe
-	 * because overhead accounts for the explicit IV. */
-	if (has_explicit_iv)
+	const unsigned overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size;
+	/* Check if version requires explicit IV */
+	if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_VERSION)
 		{
+		/* These lengths are all public so we can test them in
+		 * non-constant time.
+		 */
+		if (overhead + block_size > rec->length)
+			return 0;
+		/* We can now safely skip explicit IV */
 		rec->data += block_size;
 		rec->input += block_size;
 		rec->length -= block_size;
 		}
+	else if (overhead > rec->length)
+		return 0;
 
 	padding_length = rec->data[rec->length-1];
 
@@ -190,7 +181,7 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s,
 	if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(s->enc_read_ctx->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)
 		{
 		/* padding is already verified */
-		rec->length -= padding_length;
+		rec->length -= padding_length + 1;
 		return 1;
 		}